Category Archives: Classroom

Video of Tuesday’s MIT Class

The flash video recording of Simon’s Tuesday class on the global crisis is available here. The class agenda is available here.

Keep your eyes open for future live webcasts where you can send in comments and questions.

Session Outline: MIT Global Crisis Class, at 4pm today

link to webcast is here

Outline of session; November 18, 2008

The Global Crisis, class #3

Relevant links, including background material and tracking of all relevant developments available through http://BaselineScenario.com.  Details of session after the jump – Continue reading

MIT Global Crisis Class, Tuesday November 18th

Join us for the next live webcast of my MIT class on the global crisis.  Details after the jump…

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G20 Summit: Just Disappointing or Potentially Dangerous?

Initial reactions to the G20 summit are fairly positive, in the sense that the communique and associated press conferences conveyed (a) there was no open acrimony, (b) the body language was broadly supportive of countercyclical policies, and (c) there may now be a serious international regulatory agenda.

None of this is really new and it could all have been arranged by finance ministers (probably over the telephone), but I agree there is some useful symbolism in having heads of industrialized and emerging market governments convene for the first time (ever?) on these kind of issues.

I will admit to disappointment that no more explicit commitments were made to fiscal stimulus.  I thought the British and the French were heading in this direction, and that they could create some momentum in the right direction.  If Europeans (or anyone else) would like to compete for a “special relationship” with the US after January 20th, they might consider coming to the next summit with substantial fiscal package in hand (as will President Obama). 

If the latest rounds of global economic diplomacy were the Olympics, then China gets gold in the fiscal stimulus category, Germany gets silver, and the UK (so far) is the distant bronze – but the UK does get one more throw next week.  Not the ordering of world economic leadership that one would ordinarily expect, but perhaps that’s a good thing.

In the category of “largest cash contribution designed to save the world from serious disruption”, Japan easily finishes first – their $100bn pledge to the IMF this week was timely, targeted and hopefully not temporary.  Sadly, there were no other entrants in this category.  Perhaps the chemistry and cooking at the White House dinner on Friday will prompt further contributions in the near future?

But there is, unfortunately, another way to read the communique – as a government or international official, for whom this text really is a set of instructions to be implemented.  The whole first part of the document is generic and definitely not new, so – as an official – one’s eye skips through that quickly.  The real issue is the deliverables in the plan of action, with a pressing deadline at the end of March (this is pretty much like saying “do it tomorrow” to an official).  This is where we – an official reader is thinking – must concentrate our immediate attention and efforts.  And most of these specific actions are about tightening regulation on and around credit, or beginning processes that definitely point towards many dimensions for this kind of tightening – accounting standards, hedge funds, risk disclosures, financial sector assessments, credit rating agencies, risk management and stress testing models, international standard setters, sanctions for misconduct, reporting to supervisors in different countries, and more.

There is, of course, nothing wrong with making regulation more effective.  This is surely needed – in both the US and Europe, and probably elsewhere – to help lower the odds of another global financial crisis developing in the future.

But we are still not out of this crisis.  And tightening regulations quickly in the midst of a worldwide credit crunch is one good way to make sure that credit contracts further and faster.  Lending standards naturally tighten in a crisis; the issue to address going forward is how to prevent standards from loosening too much in the next boom – but this is at least several years down the road.  I’m in favor of starting early, but I do not like precipitate action just because you want to look busy and you could not agree on the more pressing issues, such as fiscal policy, support for the IMF, shoring up the eurozone, and so on.

It is true that one (among many) of the stated principles is: “Mitigating against pro-cyclicality in regulatory policy.”  But that is a general statement that is not mapped into operational requirements – except that the IMF and FSF should work together on this, which is a good way to make sure it doesn’t happen.  What officials have to deliver on, by the end of March, is substantive progress with regards to tougher and tighter regulation of credit.  There is a real danger that this action plan – within such a short time frame – can actually make the global downturn dramatically worse.

The G20: A Viewer’s Guide

What would constitute success and what would imply failure at the G20 heads of government meeting (dinner tonight and what is expected to be a five hour session on Saturday)? Here are three possible sets of outcomes: Continue reading

Health in a Global Crisis: Another MIT Course

The global financial crisis began (and continues) in relatively rich places, like the US and Western Europe, and it has obviously spread to previously fast growing middle-income countries, often known as “emerging markets.”

We are also beginning to see significant effects in lower-income developing countries. 

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China’s Stimulus, the IMF’s Forecast, and France’s G20 Agenda

What exactly is on the table for the G20 heads of government meeting in Washington at the end of this week?  One possibility is some sort of synchronized or joint fiscal policy stimulus in most G20 member countries.  (Yes, I know that the communique from this weekend’s meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors was somewhat on the vague side.)

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