Author: James Kwak

The Spam Filter

The spam filter seems to be catching a few more legitimate comments than usual recently. I just rescued about nine comments (out of over one hundred messages flagged as spam) from the last several days. Some of those comments were from some of our most regular commenters. I know that if you put in a lot of links your comment is more likely to be flagged. Besides that I don’t really know what it is looking for.

If your comment does not appear, feel free to email me to look into it. I do get a lot of email, but if you are a regular commenter I will try to look into it as soon as I can.

By James Kwak

What Will Change?

Timothy Garton Ash is a prominent modern European historian, who became famous writing about the collapse of Communism and the transformation of Eastern Europe in the 1990s. It was something many people thought they would never live to see.

A friend asked me what I thought of Ash’s article a couple of months ago in The Guardian, where he asked what will come of modern capitalism in the wake of the financial and economic crisis.

An extreme “neoliberal” version of the free-market economy, characterised not just by far-reaching deregulation and privatisation but also by a Gordon Gekko greed-is-good ethos – and fully realised in practice only in some areas of Anglo-Saxon and post-communist economies – seems likely to find itself [left in ruins or at least very substantially transformed]. But how about a modernised, reformed version of what postwar German thinkers called the “social market economy”?

Ash goes even farther than what you might call the Continental European social-democratic model, and envisions a world with a better balance between production and consumption, between national and international governance, and between exploitation and protection of the environment.

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S&P Revises Expectations for the Economy Downward

Calculated Risk reports that S&P is increasing its forecasts for losses on subprime mortgages again. As I’ve said before, in principle this means that their expectations about the economy are worse today than they were yesterday. They’re not just saying that defaults will go up; they’re saying that they will go up by more than they thought before today.

I previously discussed why I think this is weird, and there are a number of good comments to that earlier post. My theory that they are trying to spread out the deterioration of their forecasts over several months to save face got some support. q and others explained that rating agencies lag the economy because they base their forecasts on published economic data. That may be true, and it may be the best explanation for what is going on, but if so it seems like a condemnation of the rating agencies, since their job is to estimate the likelihood of default, and one of the inputs to their models should be the economic situation. (Or maybe their job is to estimate default likelihood assuming “normal” economic conditions, and it’s up to the investor to adjust accordingly.)

Note that these are their macroeconomic forecasts, not revisions to ratings of specific bonds, so the bond-rating schedule isn’t the driving factor here.

By James Kwak

Much Ado About Bernanke

There has been a lot of talk recently about Ben Bernanke, he of the Wall Street Journal op-ed and the multiple Congressional appearances. (Hey, can anyone put me in touch with his agent?*) At the risk of seeming ignorant (or revealing myself to be ignorant), I must say I don’t really understand what the fuss is about.

The question seems to be whether the Fed will be able to tighten monetary policy fast enough when necessary to dampen the potential inflationary effect of its current expansive monetary policy (Fed funds rate at zero, buying long-term securities, etc.). My read on the situation is as follows:

  1. Almost everyone agrees that expansive monetary policy has been appropriate during the crisis and recession to date.
  2. Everyone agrees that at some point monetary policy will have to be tightened.
  3. No one knows when that will happen.
  4. Everyone agrees that because policy has been so expansionary recently, tightening monetary policy when necessary will be more difficult than usual.
  5. Everyone agrees more or less on what tools will be available to the Fed.
  6. No one is certain the Fed will or will not be successful, because there are no relevant datapoints to compare it to.
  7. No matter what Bernanke actually thought, he would still have to say exactly what he is saying this week.

I don’t see much in there worth arguing about.

As Catherine Rampell says, a more interesting question is when the Fed will start tightening policy. This is the kind of thing that can set the Fed against the administration, as stereotypically one focuses on inflation and the other on unemployment. But since most people think it is too early to start now, that debate would be purely speculative at the moment.

* He does need a grammar checker, though. His first sentence – “The depth and breadth of the global recession has required a highly accommodative monetary policy” – contains an error in subject-verb agreement.

By James Kwak

The Problem with Federalism

Paul Krugman and many others have been talking about the “fifty little Hoovers” – state governments forced by balanced-budget rules to cut spending and raise taxes in the face of a recession, eliminating services when they are most needed and deepening the economic downturn. James Surowiecki (hat tip Matthew Yglesias) expands the attack by arguing that federalism (the idea that power is balanced between the national and state governments) in general is a problem, at least in these economic circumstances. In addition to counter-cyclical state fiscal policy, he cites political issues such as the disproportionate allocation of road spending to areas with few people and coordination problems such as the difficulty building national transportation or energy networks.

It may seem as if the balance is tilted heavily in favor of the national government – it has an army, it prints money, and so on – but the Constitution leans more toward protecting state autonomy (see the principle that the federal government is one of enumerated powers, and the Tenth Amendment), and the trend of the Reagan Revolution and the Rehnquist Court was to favor states’ rights. (Of course, “states’ rights” are not necessarily a Republican or a Democratic issue, but tend to be favored by whichever side finds the argument convenient at the moment.)

When I was young (like in high school) I thought states were silly and we should just have a national government, like in France, where the departments are mainly just administrative units. When I got a little older and became a qualified fan of Edmund Burke, I decided that the current system worked well enough most of the time that it would have to be seriously broken to justify a major structural change.

I’m not sure it qualifies as seriously broken at the moment, but I think the current recession counts as evidence that it sure isn’t the system you would design if you were starting from scratch.

By James Kwak

CEO Psychology

If you need more reasons to dislike former Bear Stearns CEO Jimmy Cayne, apparently William Cohan’s new book about the fall of Bear gives you plenty more. I’m just judging from the excerpts in Malcolm Gladwell’s new article in The New Yorker, which is really about the tendency toward overconfidence among the people who rise to the top on Wall Street, but also quotes Cayne saying that people he doesn’t like are gay – and he doesn’t mean it in a nice way.

Gladwell tries to position psychology as an alternate explanation of the financial crisis:

Since the beginning of the financial crisis, there have been two principal explanations for why so many banks made such disastrous decisions. The first is structural. Regulators did not regulate. Institutions failed to function as they should. Rules and guidelines were either inadequate or ignored. The second explanation is that Wall Street was incompetent, that the traders and investors didn’t know enough, that they made extravagant bets without understanding the consequences. But the first wave of postmortems on the crash suggests a third possibility: that the roots of Wall Street’s crisis were not structural or cognitive so much as they were psychological.

I think this is a bit much. The fact that some Wall Street actors were megalomaniacs does not change the facts that regulators did not regulate, or that rules and guidelines were inadequate. Nor is overconfidence inconsistent with incompetence.

But Gladwell is probably right that overconfidence was a factor in the terrible decisions made by so many people. The problem, Gladwell argues, is that overconfidence is a useful trait to have in many settings – perhaps even an evolutionary adaptation. But then we fall into the trap:

I’m good at that. I must be good at this, too,” we tell ourselves, forgetting that in wars and on Wall Street there is no such thing as absolute expertise.

In addition, the business world tends to breed overconfidence in CEOs. There is dumb luck in everything. But people who are successful tend to think that their success is a product of their own abilities, which leads them to overestimate those abilities. The sycophantic nature of the corporate culture at most large companies only reinforces this delusion. Then there is the insistence by the media, analysts, and institutional investors that CEOs project constant, Herculean confidence. If a CEO were to say the truth on an earnings call – “I’m pretty happy about how we did last quarter; we got lucky and closed a couple of big deals we might not have won; if things go well next quarter we’ll meet our targets, but any number of things could go wrong” – investors would fall over themselves trying to dump his or her stock.

But all of these problems are endemic to modern American capitalism, not just Wall Street banks (although Wall Street trading floors are particularly fertile breeding grounds for overconfidence, given the nature of trading gains and losses, and the amount of money being made). I would tend to put it more in the category of problems that will always be with us than the category of specific causes of the financial crisis. Maybe the specific problem here was that megalomaniacs ascended to be head of systemically important banks that could bring down the entire financial system, rather than running airlines, telecom companies, private equity firms, high-tech companies, baseball teams, or other organizations whose collapse would not have such dire consequences.

By James Kwak

What Is the Efficient Market Hypothesis?

Brad DeLong cites Underbelly citing The Economist quoting Richard Thaler:

The [Efficient Capital Markets] hypothesis has two parts, he says: the “no-free-lunch part and the price-is-right part, and if anything the first part has been strengthened as we have learned that some investment strategies are riskier than they look and it really is difficult to beat the market.” The idea that the market price is the right price, however, has been badly dented.

I think this is exactly right. Ever since graduate school I have said that I believe in efficient markets, by which I mean the “no-free-lunch part.” The idea that some people might think that “no free lunch” implied that “prices are right” didn’t even occur to me at the time. My thinking was basically like this: yes there are bubbles, but it’s hard to tell if you are in one, and even if you can tell, you can’t tell how long it will last so you can lose a lot of money betting against it, and even if you have a very long time horizon, who’s to say you won’t be in another bubble when you finally want to sell? Put another way, you may be “right” about an asset price, but if the market is composed of lots and lots of people who are “wrong,” and those people are never going away, what does that get you?

More fundamentally, for an interesting asset like a share of stock (or a house), what does it even mean for a price to be “right?” Sure, ten years later you can see what the dividends have been for ten years and what the stock price is on that date, but that price is no more “right” than any other price; it’s still a collective, irrationality-tainted guess about the future. Future states of the world are not only unknowable right now, they dont’ exist right now, so questions of right and wrong don’t even apply to them. There are just better and worse estimates, and there will never be any way to determine which estimate was better. (Just because things work out a certain way doesn’t imply that that was the most likely outcome.)

I think I’ve beaten this question into the ground recently, so I’ll stop there.

By James Kwak

More and Better

After the wholesale discrediting of the strong form of the efficient markets hypothesis, Robert Shiller may be the most respected financial economist in the world at the moment. This is what he has to say on the last page of Justin Fox’s The Myth of the Rational Market:

Finance is a huge net positive for the economy. The countries that have better-developed financial markets really do better. . . . I think that we’re less than halfway through the development of financial markets. Maybe there’s no end to it.

I think Shiller’s first and second sentences are almost certainly true. There is a strong correlation between having a high material standard of living and having a relatively sophisticated financial system; think of the United States, Japan, and Germany as opposed to Zimbabwe, for example.  But you can’t infer that more financial market “development” is always better. (I’m not saying that Shiller necessarily believes that, but most of the defenders of financial innovation take it for granted.)

Just because something is good, it doesn’t necessarily follow that more of it is better. Take food, for example. It’s pretty obvious that over a wide range – say from 0 to 1500 calories per day – more food is better for you. For most people that range probably extends up to 2000 calories or a little more. After that, not so much.

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The Rise and Rise of Jamie Dimon

As Simon pointed out earlier, Jamie Dimon has been getting a lot of good press recently. The New York Times portrayed his recent rise to prominence as not only the CEO of American’s number one bank (at least, the number one bank that has not recently been compared to a vampire squid), but as a player in Washington and, according to at least one quip, the man Barack Obama turns to on financial questions:

Now that Mr. Obama is in the White House, Mr. Dimon has been prominent when the president wants to talk to big business.

During one such meeting in late March, as Citigroup’s chairman, Richard D. Parsons, was trying to explain banks and lending, the president interrupted with a quip: “All right, I’ll talk to Jamie.”

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More on Spotting Bubbles

In comments on my previous post on bubbles, John McGowan and others point out that you can use the price-to-rent ratio (or price-to-income) as an indicator of a housing bubble. I think this is a partial but not a perfect solution.

The value of a thing should be the net present value of the future cash flows from the thing. In experimental economics, they use securities with absolutely certain cash flow profiles, so when a bubble in prices appears, you have an objective measure of value to compare it to. With individual stocks, on the other hand, the P/E ratio could go up to 100, and you can back an implied growth rate of earnings out of that, but who’s to say the company won’t hit that growth rate? At that point it’s just your opinion against the market’s.

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The AEI Versus the Real World

Peter Wallison of the American Enterprise Institute accuses the Consumer Financial Protection Agency of being a liberal plot to restrict good financial products to sophisticated elites. Mike at Rortybomb does a point-by-point takedown complete with actual data, so I can stick to the high level (not to be confused with the high road).

Wallison’s op-ed reads like a caricature of conservative ideology – all supposed moral principle and no real-world implications. His argument is basically that by imposing restrictions on complex products (Option ARM mortgages) that are not imposed on plain vanilla products (30-year fixed-rate mortgages), the CFPA is limiting choice for the poor and unsophisticated and preserving choice for the rich and sophisticated; since according to conservative ideology choice is always good in principle, the CFPA is discriminatory.

Where do we start?

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Is It Possible to Detect Bubbles?

On the one hand, it seems obvious; didn’t we all know there was a housing bubble back in 2006? On the other hand, if it’s that easy, why aren’t we all as rich as John Paulson?

A while back I suggested that the Fed could spot a housing bubble by treating housing prices the same way if treats the prices that make up the CPI. If there is high inflation in the core CPI, you don’t stop and ask if there is a fundamental reason for higher inflation; you tighten monetary policy (raise interest rates). The Fed could do the same thing for housing prices, since housing is an asset that people need to consume. But that’s probably a simplistic view.

Leigh Caldwell thinks that behavioral approaches may be able to separate out irrational overvaluation from changes in fundamental values. I believe his argument is that you can measure the degree of irrational overvaluation for certain types of assets, and you can extrapolate from there to see if there is a bubble:

Outside of the laboratory, precise knowledge of the returns of some assets does become available at times, and it would be possible to measure investors’ behaviour with regard to those assets. If investors, in aggregate, become overconfident about returns it will be possible to spot this from certain types of price change.

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The Man Who Crashed the World?

Back in November, Michael Lewis wrote a great story in Portfolio on the financial crisis, focusing on the traders who saw that the housing bubble was going to crash, bringing mortgage-backed securities down with it – and made lots of money betting on it. Now Lewis is back with his article in Vanity Fair on AIG Financial Products (FP) and its last head, Joseph Cassano. This time, though, it feels like it’s missing the usual Lewis magic.

Lewis sets out to tell the untold story of FP, based on extensive interviews with people who actually worked there. He starts by laying out the conventional wisdom about FP, which presumably he is going to debunk. The conventional wisdom, according to Lewis, is that the problem lay in credit default swaps: “The public explanation of A.I.G.’s failure focused on the credit-default swaps sold by traders at A.I.G. F.P., when A.I.G.’s problems were clearly much broader.” Indeed, Lewis implies that the government essentially framed FP: “Why were officials, both public and private, so intent on leading others to believe all the losses at A.I.G. had been caused by a few dozen traders in this fringe unit in London and Connecticut?

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The Problem with Software

Phillip Longman has an article on health care information systems with the provocative title, “Code Red: How software companies could screw up Obama’s health care reform” (hat tip Ezra Klein). The argument of the article goes something like this. One, the health care cost problem is largely caused by overtreatment. Two, the answer is software: “Almost all experts agree that in order to begin to deal with these problems, the health care industry must step into the twenty-first century and become computerized.” Three, software implementation projects can go horribly, horribly wrong. Four, the solution is open-source software.

I have no argument with point one. And I agree wholeheartedly with point three. Anecdotally (but I have seen a lot of anecdotes), the median large-scale corporate software project goes way over budget, is delivered years late, is just barely functional enough to allow the executives involved to claim they delivered something, and is hated by everyone involved. But I’m not sold on points two and four.

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