Tag: Bernanke

Still No To Bernanke

We first expressed our opposition to the reconfirmation of Ben Bernanke as chairman of the Fed on December 24th and again here on Sunday.  Since then a wide range of smart economists have argued – at the American Economic Association meetings in Atlanta – that Bernanke should be allowed to stay on.

I’ve heard at least six distinct points.  None of them are convincing.

  1. Bernanke is a great academic.  True, but not relevant to the question at hand.
  2. Bernanke ran an inspired rescue operation for the US financial system from September 2008.  Also true, but this is not now the issue we face.  We’re looking for someone who can clean up and reform the system – not someone to bail it out further. Continue reading “Still No To Bernanke”

Bernanke’s Reply: On The Doom Loop

Senator David Vitter submitted one of my questions to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, as part of his reconfirmation hearings, and received the following reply in writing (as already published in the WSJ on-line).

Q. Simon Johnson, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and blogger: Andrew Haldane, head of financial stability at the Bank of England, argues that the relationship between the banking system and the government (in the U.K. and the U.S.) creates a “doom loop” in which there are repeated boom-bust-bailout cycles that tend to get cost the taxpayer more and pose greater threat to the macro economy over time. What can be done to break this loop?

A. The “doom loop” that Andrew Haldane describes is a consequence of the problem of moral hazard in which the existence of explicit government backstops (such as deposit insurance or liquidity facilities) or of presumed government support leads firms to take on more risk or rely on less robust funding than they would otherwise. A new regulatory structure should address this problem. Continue reading “Bernanke’s Reply: On The Doom Loop”

Firefighter Arson And Our Macroeconomic Policymakers

Firefighter arson is a serious problem.  The U.S. Fire Administration, part of Homeland Security, concluded in 2003, “A very small percentage of otherwise trustworthy firefighters cause the very flames they are dispatched to put out” (p.1). Illustrative and shocking anecdotes are on pp. 9-15 of that report, as well as here and here.

Macroeconomic policy making now has a similar issue to confront. Continue reading “Firefighter Arson And Our Macroeconomic Policymakers”

Chat Today About Bernanke Nomination For Reappointment (1pm Eastern)

The Washington Post is hosting an on-line chat about Ben Bernanke and his likely reappointment as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (today, 1pm eastern: use this link to chat).  News story on President Obama’s announcement of Bernanke’s renomination this morning, with video of press conference, is here.

You can submit questions in advance or live during the chat, which will probably run until about 2pm.

By Simon Johnson

Update: here’s the transcript of the chat; a lot of very good questions.

Which Bernanke? Whose Bubble?

Ben Bernanke will be nominated for a second term as chairman of the Federal Reserve.  But which Bernanke are we getting?  There are at least three.

  1. The Bernanke who led the charge to rescue the US (and world’s) financial system after the Lehman-AIG collapse.  If you accept that the choice from late September was “Collapse or Rescue,” this Bernanke did a great job.
  2. The Bernanke who argued for keeping interest rates low as the housing bubble developed.  This Bernanke was part of the Greenspan Illusion – the Fed should ignore bubbles and “just clean up afterwards.”  Is that still Bernanke’s view?  Surely, he has learned from that experience.
  3. Then there is Bernanke-the-reformer.  Given #1 and #2 above, shouldn’t he be pushing hard for tough re-regulation of the financial system – particularly those dodgy parts where markets meet banking?  But is there any sign of such an agenda, even with regard to recently trampled consumers – let alone “too big to fail” financial institutions?

Most likely, we’re in for another bubble. Continue reading “Which Bernanke? Whose Bubble?”

Waiting For The Federal Reserve’s Next Apology

In November 2002, Ben Bernanke apologized – for the Fed’s role in causing the Great Depression of the 1930s.  “I would like to say to Milton [Friedman] and Anna [Schwartz]: Regarding the Great Depression. You’re right, we did it. We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, we won’t do it again” (conclusion of this speech).

Bernanke’s point, of course, is that the Fed tightened monetary policy inappropriately – and allowed banks to fail – in 1929-33.  And much has been made of his strong focus, over the past year, on avoiding a repeat of those or closely related mistakes (including here).

But today we need a different kind of apology, or at least a statement of responsibility, from Ben Bernanke and the Fed. Continue reading “Waiting For The Federal Reserve’s Next Apology”

Bernanke And The Lobbies: Confidence Illusion

Ben Bernanke is opposed to the creation of a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency.  Disregarding his organization’s disappointing track record in this regard, he claims that the Fed can handle this issue perfectly well going forward.

He thus adds his voice to the cacophony of financial sector lobbyists favoring the status quo.

At the same time, Bernanke and the lobbyists talk about the importance of consumer confidence for the recovery.  But how can you expect anyone to have confidence enough to spend and borrow when so many people have been so badly treated by the financial sector in recent years? Continue reading “Bernanke And The Lobbies: Confidence Illusion”

Much Ado About Bernanke

There has been a lot of talk recently about Ben Bernanke, he of the Wall Street Journal op-ed and the multiple Congressional appearances. (Hey, can anyone put me in touch with his agent?*) At the risk of seeming ignorant (or revealing myself to be ignorant), I must say I don’t really understand what the fuss is about.

The question seems to be whether the Fed will be able to tighten monetary policy fast enough when necessary to dampen the potential inflationary effect of its current expansive monetary policy (Fed funds rate at zero, buying long-term securities, etc.). My read on the situation is as follows:

  1. Almost everyone agrees that expansive monetary policy has been appropriate during the crisis and recession to date.
  2. Everyone agrees that at some point monetary policy will have to be tightened.
  3. No one knows when that will happen.
  4. Everyone agrees that because policy has been so expansionary recently, tightening monetary policy when necessary will be more difficult than usual.
  5. Everyone agrees more or less on what tools will be available to the Fed.
  6. No one is certain the Fed will or will not be successful, because there are no relevant datapoints to compare it to.
  7. No matter what Bernanke actually thought, he would still have to say exactly what he is saying this week.

I don’t see much in there worth arguing about.

As Catherine Rampell says, a more interesting question is when the Fed will start tightening policy. This is the kind of thing that can set the Fed against the administration, as stereotypically one focuses on inflation and the other on unemployment. But since most people think it is too early to start now, that debate would be purely speculative at the moment.

* He does need a grammar checker, though. His first sentence – “The depth and breadth of the global recession has required a highly accommodative monetary policy” – contains an error in subject-verb agreement.

By James Kwak

Bernanke Didn’t Go Far Enough

Ben Bernanke gave a good speech yesterday, warning about the dangers associated with not putting the federal budget immediately on a path to credible fiscal consolidation.  But he didn’t push his points hard enough – see my column, joint with Peter Boone, on the NYT’s Economix this morning.

U.S fiscal policies helped break the recent panic by showing that the government will support aggregate spending, irrespective of what the private sector fears.  But once households and firms calm down, you need to demonstrate that the national debt is not on an explosive path.

Mr. Geithner’s speech in China this week, trying to make this claim, was not convincing.  Mr. Bernanke, politely but firmly, pointed this out yesterday.

We should also worry about the Fed, of course, because there is no indication that they are ready, willing or able to curtail their quantitative easing if the real economy definitely turns more positive.  David Wessel’s column in the WSJ today (page A2) has a sensible discussion.

By Simon Johnson

Ben Bernanke: More Important Than The G20 Summit

It may strike you as extraordinary that the G20 summit barely touched on what is, arguably, the key policy issue going forward – what will central banks do, including the detailed when and how of avoiding falling wages and prices (deflation).  Fiscal stimulus is already almost fully in play around the world, regulatory reform will at best be slow and not relevant to the recovery, and “we promise to avoid an irresponsible protectionist trade war” is nice but more about not making things worse rather than getting our economies going again.  Funding and leadership model change for the IMF can help prevent emerging markets from cratering, but in terms of impact on global growth or unemployment, it’s second order relative to the macro policies of the world’s largest countries.

The real issue is monetary policy, including interest rate cuts where there is still room for these – to me the biggest news of the week was actually that the European Central Bank cut rates by less than expected (its main interest rate stands at 1.25 percent).  This confirms the ECB still does not see deflation as a clear and present danger.  Look at all the downward pressures in the European economy, from East European collapses (and associated West European banking problems) to property market declines in the UK, Ireland and Spain (and what that means for banking) and export industry stress (and they have bankers too).  The ECB is taking an extraordinary and – to my mind – incorrect position.  If they truly wait until deflation is “fully in the data” (central bank jargon), it will be too late.

The dramatic trans-Atlantic, or at least eurozone-dollar, contrast is in terms of monetary policy, not fiscal stimulus or attitudes towards future regulation.  In our piece in the Washinton Post Outlook section on Sunday (already online), we provide an updated back story on how exactly the Fed and its chair got to the point of taking bold and unprecedented moves towards expansionary monetary and credit policy.  Continue reading “Ben Bernanke: More Important Than The G20 Summit”

Causes Of A Great Inflation: Tunneling For Resurrection

Here is Ben Bernanke’s problem.

1. The financial sector is busy setting up arrangements in which employees are guaranteed high levels of compensation if they stay on through the difficult days ahead.  These retention-type payments allow firms to survive in their existing form, pursue business-as-usual, and gamble for resurrection, i.e., make further risky investments.

2. But these same payment schemes, e.g., Goldman Sachs’ loans-for-employees deal, are a form of poison pill with regard to further bailouts – the Administration may want to help these firms down the road, but this kind of tunneling means Congress will put its foot down.  Do you think that President Obama’s $750bn for bailouts (scored as $250bn) will survive the budget process?  No New Bailout Money is a slogan reaching from here to the midterm congressional elections. 

3. And the financial system is in big trouble.  Unless the economy turns around, somewhat miraculously, we are in for a big slump.  Or even for a Great Depression – watch closely the words and body language in Bernanke’s interview on 60 Minutes

The big banks are essentially making themselves Too Politically Toxic To Rescue, and this has potentially bad macroeconomic consequences.  So what will Bernanke do? Continue reading “Causes Of A Great Inflation: Tunneling For Resurrection”

Political Will: Bernanke On The True Cost Of Banking

Stabilization programs in emerging markets often come down to this: the government needs to do something unpopular, e.g., reduce some subsidies, privatize an industry, or eliminate the crazy credit that goes to oligarchs – no one likes oligarchs, but their factories employ a lot of people.  There is naturally resistance – pushback from legislators, riots in the streets, or oligarchs calling their friends in the US foreign policy establishment.  The question becomes: does the government have the “political will” to get the job done?

In fall 1997, a key issue for Indonesia’s IMF program was whether the government could close the banking operations belonging to one of President Suharto’s sons.  There was an epic and fascinating struggle and, in the end, the government did not have sufficient political will or power.  The subsequent loss of US support, and further currency and economic collapse is (messy and painful for many) history.

It is striking that Ben Bernanke now asks whether the United States today has sufficient political will. Continue reading “Political Will: Bernanke On The True Cost Of Banking”