Month: July 2009

Bernanke And The Lobbies: Confidence Illusion

Ben Bernanke is opposed to the creation of a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency.  Disregarding his organization’s disappointing track record in this regard, he claims that the Fed can handle this issue perfectly well going forward.

He thus adds his voice to the cacophony of financial sector lobbyists favoring the status quo.

At the same time, Bernanke and the lobbyists talk about the importance of consumer confidence for the recovery.  But how can you expect anyone to have confidence enough to spend and borrow when so many people have been so badly treated by the financial sector in recent years? Continue reading “Bernanke And The Lobbies: Confidence Illusion”

The Spam Filter

The spam filter seems to be catching a few more legitimate comments than usual recently. I just rescued about nine comments (out of over one hundred messages flagged as spam) from the last several days. Some of those comments were from some of our most regular commenters. I know that if you put in a lot of links your comment is more likely to be flagged. Besides that I don’t really know what it is looking for.

If your comment does not appear, feel free to email me to look into it. I do get a lot of email, but if you are a regular commenter I will try to look into it as soon as I can.

By James Kwak

What Will Change?

Timothy Garton Ash is a prominent modern European historian, who became famous writing about the collapse of Communism and the transformation of Eastern Europe in the 1990s. It was something many people thought they would never live to see.

A friend asked me what I thought of Ash’s article a couple of months ago in The Guardian, where he asked what will come of modern capitalism in the wake of the financial and economic crisis.

An extreme “neoliberal” version of the free-market economy, characterised not just by far-reaching deregulation and privatisation but also by a Gordon Gekko greed-is-good ethos – and fully realised in practice only in some areas of Anglo-Saxon and post-communist economies – seems likely to find itself [left in ruins or at least very substantially transformed]. But how about a modernised, reformed version of what postwar German thinkers called the “social market economy”?

Ash goes even farther than what you might call the Continental European social-democratic model, and envisions a world with a better balance between production and consumption, between national and international governance, and between exploitation and protection of the environment.

Continue reading “What Will Change?”

S&P Revises Expectations for the Economy Downward

Calculated Risk reports that S&P is increasing its forecasts for losses on subprime mortgages again. As I’ve said before, in principle this means that their expectations about the economy are worse today than they were yesterday. They’re not just saying that defaults will go up; they’re saying that they will go up by more than they thought before today.

I previously discussed why I think this is weird, and there are a number of good comments to that earlier post. My theory that they are trying to spread out the deterioration of their forecasts over several months to save face got some support. q and others explained that rating agencies lag the economy because they base their forecasts on published economic data. That may be true, and it may be the best explanation for what is going on, but if so it seems like a condemnation of the rating agencies, since their job is to estimate the likelihood of default, and one of the inputs to their models should be the economic situation. (Or maybe their job is to estimate default likelihood assuming “normal” economic conditions, and it’s up to the investor to adjust accordingly.)

Note that these are their macroeconomic forecasts, not revisions to ratings of specific bonds, so the bond-rating schedule isn’t the driving factor here.

By James Kwak

What Are You (Or Barney Frank) Going To Do About It?

At a hearing of the House Financial Services Committee yesterday, Barney Frank nicely summarized where we are with regard to re-regulation of our largest financial institutions: some of them are definitely “too big to fail”, with the potential to present the authorities with what Larry Summers calls the “collapse or bailout” choice, but what exactly should be done about it?

On a five-person panel, I had the middle seat (as usual) and found myself agreeing with points made both to my left and to my right.  Alice Rivlin is correct that we need to control leverage as well as increase capital requirements, and the Fed’s tools vis-à-vis leverage need modernization – your grandparents’ margin requirements would not suffice.  Peter Wallison, a member of the new financial crisis investigation commission, stresses that capital requirements should be higher for larger banks.  Paul Mahoney wants to change the bankruptcy code, to make it easier for courts to handle large financial firms in quick time; recent CIT Group events suggest this is a good idea.

And Mark Zandi was persuasive on the point that households had no idea what they were signing up to with option ARMs – even he has trouble with those spreadsheets.  Effective consumer protection – including a new consumer safety commission – would definitely contribute to financial system stability.

What will Barney Frank and his committee do?  There will be no “Tier 1 Holding Company” category of firms, if Frank has anything to do with it; this is too much like creating an implicit government guarantee. Frank is clearly drawn towards higher capital requirements or more insurance payments from firms that pose more system risk.  I suggested total assets of 1% of GDP as a threshold, but we agree this should be essentially a progressive drag on profits – creating the strong market-based incentive for the biggest firms to downsize.

Other than that, watch this space.

My written testimony submitted to the committee is below. Continue reading “What Are You (Or Barney Frank) Going To Do About It?”

Much Ado About Bernanke

There has been a lot of talk recently about Ben Bernanke, he of the Wall Street Journal op-ed and the multiple Congressional appearances. (Hey, can anyone put me in touch with his agent?*) At the risk of seeming ignorant (or revealing myself to be ignorant), I must say I don’t really understand what the fuss is about.

The question seems to be whether the Fed will be able to tighten monetary policy fast enough when necessary to dampen the potential inflationary effect of its current expansive monetary policy (Fed funds rate at zero, buying long-term securities, etc.). My read on the situation is as follows:

  1. Almost everyone agrees that expansive monetary policy has been appropriate during the crisis and recession to date.
  2. Everyone agrees that at some point monetary policy will have to be tightened.
  3. No one knows when that will happen.
  4. Everyone agrees that because policy has been so expansionary recently, tightening monetary policy when necessary will be more difficult than usual.
  5. Everyone agrees more or less on what tools will be available to the Fed.
  6. No one is certain the Fed will or will not be successful, because there are no relevant datapoints to compare it to.
  7. No matter what Bernanke actually thought, he would still have to say exactly what he is saying this week.

I don’t see much in there worth arguing about.

As Catherine Rampell says, a more interesting question is when the Fed will start tightening policy. This is the kind of thing that can set the Fed against the administration, as stereotypically one focuses on inflation and the other on unemployment. But since most people think it is too early to start now, that debate would be purely speculative at the moment.

* He does need a grammar checker, though. His first sentence – “The depth and breadth of the global recession has required a highly accommodative monetary policy” – contains an error in subject-verb agreement.

By James Kwak

The Problem with Federalism

Paul Krugman and many others have been talking about the “fifty little Hoovers” – state governments forced by balanced-budget rules to cut spending and raise taxes in the face of a recession, eliminating services when they are most needed and deepening the economic downturn. James Surowiecki (hat tip Matthew Yglesias) expands the attack by arguing that federalism (the idea that power is balanced between the national and state governments) in general is a problem, at least in these economic circumstances. In addition to counter-cyclical state fiscal policy, he cites political issues such as the disproportionate allocation of road spending to areas with few people and coordination problems such as the difficulty building national transportation or energy networks.

It may seem as if the balance is tilted heavily in favor of the national government – it has an army, it prints money, and so on – but the Constitution leans more toward protecting state autonomy (see the principle that the federal government is one of enumerated powers, and the Tenth Amendment), and the trend of the Reagan Revolution and the Rehnquist Court was to favor states’ rights. (Of course, “states’ rights” are not necessarily a Republican or a Democratic issue, but tend to be favored by whichever side finds the argument convenient at the moment.)

When I was young (like in high school) I thought states were silly and we should just have a national government, like in France, where the departments are mainly just administrative units. When I got a little older and became a qualified fan of Edmund Burke, I decided that the current system worked well enough most of the time that it would have to be seriously broken to justify a major structural change.

I’m not sure it qualifies as seriously broken at the moment, but I think the current recession counts as evidence that it sure isn’t the system you would design if you were starting from scratch.

By James Kwak

Three Myths about the Consumer Financial Product Agency

This guest post was contributed by Elizabeth Warren, chair of the Congressional Oversight Panel and the Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law at Harvard University. (Update: more on the case for a CFPA in her YouTube video, released yesterday.)

I’ve written a lot about the creation of a new Consumer Protection Financial Agency (CFPA), starting with an article I wrote in the Democracy Journal in the summer of 2007. My writing has helped me work through the idea and has advanced a conversation about what kind of changes in financial products would be most effective. A couple of weeks ago, I testified before the House Financial Services Committee about why I think a new consumer agency is so important, and I’ve argued the case many times.

Today, though, I’d like to post specifically about some of the push back that has developed on this issue.  In particular, I’d like to focus on three big myths – myths designed to protect the same status quo that triggered the economic crisis. Continue reading “Three Myths about the Consumer Financial Product Agency”

CEO Psychology

If you need more reasons to dislike former Bear Stearns CEO Jimmy Cayne, apparently William Cohan’s new book about the fall of Bear gives you plenty more. I’m just judging from the excerpts in Malcolm Gladwell’s new article in The New Yorker, which is really about the tendency toward overconfidence among the people who rise to the top on Wall Street, but also quotes Cayne saying that people he doesn’t like are gay – and he doesn’t mean it in a nice way.

Gladwell tries to position psychology as an alternate explanation of the financial crisis:

Since the beginning of the financial crisis, there have been two principal explanations for why so many banks made such disastrous decisions. The first is structural. Regulators did not regulate. Institutions failed to function as they should. Rules and guidelines were either inadequate or ignored. The second explanation is that Wall Street was incompetent, that the traders and investors didn’t know enough, that they made extravagant bets without understanding the consequences. But the first wave of postmortems on the crash suggests a third possibility: that the roots of Wall Street’s crisis were not structural or cognitive so much as they were psychological.

I think this is a bit much. The fact that some Wall Street actors were megalomaniacs does not change the facts that regulators did not regulate, or that rules and guidelines were inadequate. Nor is overconfidence inconsistent with incompetence.

But Gladwell is probably right that overconfidence was a factor in the terrible decisions made by so many people. The problem, Gladwell argues, is that overconfidence is a useful trait to have in many settings – perhaps even an evolutionary adaptation. But then we fall into the trap:

I’m good at that. I must be good at this, too,” we tell ourselves, forgetting that in wars and on Wall Street there is no such thing as absolute expertise.

In addition, the business world tends to breed overconfidence in CEOs. There is dumb luck in everything. But people who are successful tend to think that their success is a product of their own abilities, which leads them to overestimate those abilities. The sycophantic nature of the corporate culture at most large companies only reinforces this delusion. Then there is the insistence by the media, analysts, and institutional investors that CEOs project constant, Herculean confidence. If a CEO were to say the truth on an earnings call – “I’m pretty happy about how we did last quarter; we got lucky and closed a couple of big deals we might not have won; if things go well next quarter we’ll meet our targets, but any number of things could go wrong” – investors would fall over themselves trying to dump his or her stock.

But all of these problems are endemic to modern American capitalism, not just Wall Street banks (although Wall Street trading floors are particularly fertile breeding grounds for overconfidence, given the nature of trading gains and losses, and the amount of money being made). I would tend to put it more in the category of problems that will always be with us than the category of specific causes of the financial crisis. Maybe the specific problem here was that megalomaniacs ascended to be head of systemically important banks that could bring down the entire financial system, rather than running airlines, telecom companies, private equity firms, high-tech companies, baseball teams, or other organizations whose collapse would not have such dire consequences.

By James Kwak

What Is the Efficient Market Hypothesis?

Brad DeLong cites Underbelly citing The Economist quoting Richard Thaler:

The [Efficient Capital Markets] hypothesis has two parts, he says: the “no-free-lunch part and the price-is-right part, and if anything the first part has been strengthened as we have learned that some investment strategies are riskier than they look and it really is difficult to beat the market.” The idea that the market price is the right price, however, has been badly dented.

I think this is exactly right. Ever since graduate school I have said that I believe in efficient markets, by which I mean the “no-free-lunch part.” The idea that some people might think that “no free lunch” implied that “prices are right” didn’t even occur to me at the time. My thinking was basically like this: yes there are bubbles, but it’s hard to tell if you are in one, and even if you can tell, you can’t tell how long it will last so you can lose a lot of money betting against it, and even if you have a very long time horizon, who’s to say you won’t be in another bubble when you finally want to sell? Put another way, you may be “right” about an asset price, but if the market is composed of lots and lots of people who are “wrong,” and those people are never going away, what does that get you?

More fundamentally, for an interesting asset like a share of stock (or a house), what does it even mean for a price to be “right?” Sure, ten years later you can see what the dividends have been for ten years and what the stock price is on that date, but that price is no more “right” than any other price; it’s still a collective, irrationality-tainted guess about the future. Future states of the world are not only unknowable right now, they dont’ exist right now, so questions of right and wrong don’t even apply to them. There are just better and worse estimates, and there will never be any way to determine which estimate was better. (Just because things work out a certain way doesn’t imply that that was the most likely outcome.)

I think I’ve beaten this question into the ground recently, so I’ll stop there.

By James Kwak

More and Better

After the wholesale discrediting of the strong form of the efficient markets hypothesis, Robert Shiller may be the most respected financial economist in the world at the moment. This is what he has to say on the last page of Justin Fox’s The Myth of the Rational Market:

Finance is a huge net positive for the economy. The countries that have better-developed financial markets really do better. . . . I think that we’re less than halfway through the development of financial markets. Maybe there’s no end to it.

I think Shiller’s first and second sentences are almost certainly true. There is a strong correlation between having a high material standard of living and having a relatively sophisticated financial system; think of the United States, Japan, and Germany as opposed to Zimbabwe, for example.  But you can’t infer that more financial market “development” is always better. (I’m not saying that Shiller necessarily believes that, but most of the defenders of financial innovation take it for granted.)

Just because something is good, it doesn’t necessarily follow that more of it is better. Take food, for example. It’s pretty obvious that over a wide range – say from 0 to 1500 calories per day – more food is better for you. For most people that range probably extends up to 2000 calories or a little more. After that, not so much.

Continue reading “More and Better”

The Rise and Rise of Jamie Dimon

As Simon pointed out earlier, Jamie Dimon has been getting a lot of good press recently. The New York Times portrayed his recent rise to prominence as not only the CEO of American’s number one bank (at least, the number one bank that has not recently been compared to a vampire squid), but as a player in Washington and, according to at least one quip, the man Barack Obama turns to on financial questions:

Now that Mr. Obama is in the White House, Mr. Dimon has been prominent when the president wants to talk to big business.

During one such meeting in late March, as Citigroup’s chairman, Richard D. Parsons, was trying to explain banks and lending, the president interrupted with a quip: “All right, I’ll talk to Jamie.”

Continue reading “The Rise and Rise of Jamie Dimon”

Jamie Dimon v. Larry Summers

Jamie Dimon has won big.  JP Morgan Chase now stands alone, both in financial position and political clout – including special access to the White House and, as explained in today’s NYT, Rahm Emanuel’s likely attendance at his next board meeting tomorrow. 

Dimon’s semiotics have been brilliant throughout the crisis – it wasn’t his fault, he was forced to take TARP money, and – in phrasing that will make the history books – bankers should not be “vilified”.  But now he has a problem.

Larry Summers forcefully stated Friday that high recent profit levels for big banks (i.e., JPMorgan and Goldman) are based on the support they received and still receive from the government (listen to his answer to the second question, from about the 6:10 to 10:30 mark).  At that level of generality, in a period of financial stabilization and consequent reduction in executive branch discretion, this statement does not threaten Dimon or anyone else.

And Summers’ statement on the dangers of “too big to fail” was “too vague to succeed”.  Dimon saw this one coming and is very much aligned with Tim Geithner on the technocratic fixes that will supposedly take care of this – the mythical “resolution authority”, which will not actually achieve anything because it has no cross-border component, so the next time a major multinational bank (e.g., JP Morgan) fails, the choice again will be “collapse or bailout” (as Summers put it in the same Q&A Friday).  Yes, I know the G20 is supposedly working on this; no, I don’t think they are making progress.

But Summers also drew a line in the sand on consumer protection. Continue reading “Jamie Dimon v. Larry Summers”

More on Spotting Bubbles

In comments on my previous post on bubbles, John McGowan and others point out that you can use the price-to-rent ratio (or price-to-income) as an indicator of a housing bubble. I think this is a partial but not a perfect solution.

The value of a thing should be the net present value of the future cash flows from the thing. In experimental economics, they use securities with absolutely certain cash flow profiles, so when a bubble in prices appears, you have an objective measure of value to compare it to. With individual stocks, on the other hand, the P/E ratio could go up to 100, and you can back an implied growth rate of earnings out of that, but who’s to say the company won’t hit that growth rate? At that point it’s just your opinion against the market’s.

Continue reading “More on Spotting Bubbles”

Who Nationalized Whom?

Hank Paulson’s testimony yesterday was informative, if only because it illustrated that he himself still understands little about the origins and nature of the global crisis over which he presided.  Perhaps his book, out this fall, will redeem his reputation.

A fundamental principle in any emerging market crisis is that not all of the oligarchs can be saved.  There is an adding up constraint – the state cannot access enough resources to bail out all the big players.

The people who control the state can decide who is out of business and who stays in, but this is never an overnight decision written on a single piece of paper.  Instead, there is a process – and a struggle by competing oligarchs – to influence, persuade, or in some way push the “policymakers” towards the view:

  1. My private firm must be saved, for the good of the country.
  2. It must remain private, otherwise this will prevent an economic recovery.
  3. I should be allowed to acquire other assets, opportunities, or simply market share, as a way to speed recovery for the nation.

Who won this argument in the US and on what basis?  And have the winners perhaps done a bit too well – thinking just about their own political futures?

Continue reading “Who Nationalized Whom?”