Category: External perspectives

Can the Public-Private Plan Work?

Back in September, Simon and I wrote two op-eds on the governance and pricing challenges of buying toxic assets. As many people have noted, those problems have not gone away. The latter, in particular, represents a formidable barrier to Tim Geithner’s latest proposal to create a public-private partnership to relieve banks of their toxic assets. (In summary, the problem is that banks do not want to sell at the price the free market will offer, because (a) they think the assets will be worth more later and (b) doing so would force them to take writedowns that might make them insolvent.)

Lucian Bebchuk also wrote an op-ed on this topic in September, and to his credit he is still trying to turn “TARP II” into something feasible in his new paper, “How to Make Tarp II Work.” The paper has some good ideas but I’m not sure it solves the basic problem, which unfortunately has to do with the laws of arithmetic.

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No Wishful Thinking

At management team meetings at my old company, there was a slogan I was known for: “No wishful thinking.” I would trot it out whenever I felt like our expectations for the future (say, our sales projections, or our product delivery dates) were being influenced by our desires for the future. Let’s say, for example, that you have to hit your sales target, raise more money, or lay people off. It is very easy to plan around hitting your sales target, because the other options are unpleasant. But that would clearly be folly.

I thought of this when listening to an interview Adam Posen did for Monday’s Planet Money (beginning around the 6-minute mark). The Geithner Plan had not yet been announced, but Posen already had the right diagnosis: wishful thinking. The administration, on his analysis, is hoping that it will be able to turn the economy around without having to take tough measures with the banks.

Martin Wolf puts it this way:

[H]oping for the best is what one sees in . . . the new plans for fixing the banking system. . . .

The banking programme seems to be yet another child of the failed interventions of the past one and a half years: optimistic and indecisive.

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And Now, the Counterargument

With mainstream and not-so-mainstream economists (including us) tripping over themselves talking about the need for a stimulus plan (and how the current one may actually be too small), and having just written an article saying the U.S. can probably absorb some more national debt before things go haywire (so did Simon), I thought it was only fair to point to the counterargument.

William Buiter at the FT argues that the U.S. cannot afford a major fiscal stimulus because the government (by which I think he means the entire political system, not just the Obama Administration) has no deficit-fighting credibility. If people do not believe that the government will raise taxes in the future to generate positive balances (I’m sorry to inform Congressional Republicans that cutting spending is not really an option, given the growth of entitlement commitments in the future and our increasing military needs, although cutting the growth rate of spending might be possible), they will conclude that the debt can only be paid off by inflating it away, which will drive interest rates up, the dollar down, and inflation up. Buiter spells this argument here and more recently here where he adds the U.S. is behaving like an emerging market economy in crisis (something with which we would agree).

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More on Financial Education

My earlier post on basic financial education got a fair amount of attention, so I wanted to point out one source for more information on the topic. Zvi Bodie, Dennis McLeavey, and Laurence B. Siegel hosted a conference in 2006 on “The Future of Life-Cycle Saving and Investing,” and the most of the presentations and comments can be downloaded as a PDF from this site. Some of the general themes of the conference were: people don’t save enough for retirement; people have to make important financial decisions on their own; but people tend to make suboptimal financial decisions (like not rolling over retirement accounts), so giving them more “choice” leads to bad results; and the financial advice they are getting is not necessarily helpful.

Bodie, in his concluding remarks on investor education (pp. 169-71), provides this diagnosis:

We need institutional innovation to address the problem of investor education. Most people have honorable intentions, but we all want to make a living. In that respect, we are all salesmen to some extent. The trick, therefore, is getting people to serve the public interest while they are serving their own interests. . . .

[T]he U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is part of the problem. The educational materials distributed by financial services firms and by the SEC are often misleading and biased in favor of products that may not be suitable for large numbers of consumers. . . .

Therefore, universities and professional associations should cooperate in designing, producing, and disseminating objective financial education that is genuinely trustworthy. In doing so, we have to distinguish between marketing materials and bona fide education.

But there is lots more interesting stuff throughout the book. Laurence Kotlikoff (pp. 55-71) analyzes the problems with the conventional method of estimating target retirement savings, and shows that small mistakes can lead to unhappy outcomes. And the sessions are full of frightening information, especially Alicia Munnell’s session; for example, in 2004 the average 401(k)/IRA balance for a head of household age 55-64 was only $60,000. The outlook for retirement security looks pretty grim. And all of this was written at the peak of the boom.

The Importance of Education

Robert Shiller, he of the Case-Shiller Index (and therefore a reasonable symbolic candidate for 2008 Man of the Year, were it not for a certain presidential election), has an op-ed in The New York Times advocating a government program to subsidize financial advice for anyone, particularly low-income people. There is a lot to like about this idea. In Shiller’s proposal, the subsidy would only apply to advisors who charge by the hour and do not take commissions or fund management fees, so they would have no incentive to steer clients into particular investments or into unnecessary transactions. It seems reasonable that, if they had access to impartial advice, some people might not have taken on mortgages they had no hope of paying back or, more prosaically, some people might do a better job of budgeting and take on less credit card debt.

But I have one major reservation, which is that I’m not sure how good the financial advice would be. In my opinion, most financial advice floating around is worth less than nothing. To take the most obvious example: by sheer volume, the largest proportion of financial advice that exists (counting all advice that anyone gives to anyone else via any means of communication) is almost certainly advice on buying individual stocks, and the second largest is probably advice on choosing mutual funds. I am firmly in the camp that believes that whether or not stocks obey the efficent market hypothesis, it is not within the capabilities of any individual investor to identify stock trades that will have an expected risk-adjusted return higher than the market as a whole, net of transaction costs. I also believe it is not in within the capabilities of any stock mutual fund manager, and that all of the variation in risk-adjusted mutual fund performance can be explained by pure statistical variation. And even if I’m wrong about that, and there are a few exceptional fund managers out there, I don’t believe that any individual could distinguish the exceptional managers from the simply lucky ones; and even if he could, by the time he did he would be buying into a fund that had grown so big it was no longer capable of above-market returns.

If this is so, why doesn’t the market for financial advice take care of this problem?

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The Cost of Reputation

Or, more accurately, the cost of caring about your reputation.

My recent article on Risk Management for Beginners closed with some unrigorous speculation about the peculiar incentives of fund managers, who are consistently well compensated in decent and good years and, in bad years, lose their clients’ money and move on to start a new fund. Steven Malliaris and Hongjun Yan have a paper on this topic entitled “Nickels Versus Black Swans:” “nickels” being the typical hedge fund strategy of making a small but consistent return with a small risk of a huge loss, and “black swans” being Taleb’s preferred strategy that makes a small but consistent loss with a small risk of a huge gain.

Simplifying the model, the problem with a black swan strategy is that by the time the huge gain rolls around, you the manager have already been fired (your clients have withdrawn their money) because of your consistent losses. The result is overinvestment in nickel strategies and underinvestment in black swan strategies – even when the latter have a higher expected return. This result holds even when you assume that the investors are sophisticated, because the key factor is the reputational concerns of the fund managers themselves.

Malliaris and Yan also show that the system can reach multiple equilibrium points: the system can be in one equilibrium where most hedge funds are pursuing suboptimal strategies, and then suddenly shift to another quickly, meaning that the hedge fund industry does not allocate capital as efficiently as one might imagine. This might help explain why (a) everyone is saying that AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities are underpriced yet (b) no one is buying them.

This paper might be seen as simply translating common sense into mathematics. Seen another way, though, it helps explain why individually rational behavior (by fund managers) does not produce the efficient outcomes you learn in first-year economics.

Reliving the Fun Times

With the holidays coming to an end, my little burst of reading books (as opposed to newspapers and blogs) is coming to an end with the recent collection Panic, edited by Michael Lewis, which I got for Christmas. (I also got Snowball, the new biography of Warren Buffett, but that’s 900 pages long, so it may be a while.) The book contains several as-it-happened articles on each of four recent financial panics: the 1987 stock market crash, the 1997-98 emerging markets crisis, the collapse of the Internet bubble, and the thing we’re going through now. It’s long on entertainment – both the entertainment of hearing people say things like, “The more time that goes by, the less concerned I am about a housing bubble,” and the entertainment of reading legitimately good writing, some of it by Lewis himself. But given the format, it’s necessarily short on analysis, and its main point, if any, seems to be that all panics are alike: people underestimate risk, they think they are different, they do silly things, Wall Street people make a killing, and then bad things happen.

I believe the book was released in November, but it seems like the final touches were put on sometime in late spring or early summer – Bear Stearns had fallen, but Freddie and Fannie were still independent, and Lehman was just another investment bank. So the book provides this past summer’s perspective on the crisis: a collapsing housing bubble taking down isolated hedge funds that had invested in mortgage-backed CDOs, and one investment bank (Bear Stearns) for no clearly explained reason: Lewis’s own essay on the topic focuses on the inherent complexity of Wall Street firms and how even their CEOs don’t understand them. Reading the articles from 2007 and early 2008 reminds you how few people if any foresaw the impact the collapsing bubble would have on the financial sector as a whole.

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IMF Speaks

On Monday, the IMF released a new research “note” entitled “Fiscal Policy for the Crisis,” which sets out recommendations for fiscal policy to address the global economic downturn. The premises of the note are, first, that the financial system must be fixed before it is possible to increase demand and, second, that there is limited scope for monetary policy, leaving fiscal policy as the main weapon. The executive summary provides the main recommendation in short form:

The optimal fiscal package should be timely, large, lasting, diversified, contingent, collective, and sustainable: timely, because the need for action is immediate; large, because the current and expected decrease in private demand is exceptionally large; lasting because the downturn will last for some time; diversified because of the unusual degree of uncertainty associated with any single measure; contingent, because the need to reduce the perceived probability of another “Great Depression” requires a commitment to do more, if needed; collective, since each country that has fiscal space should contribute; and sustainable, so as not to lead to a debt explosion and adverse reactions of financial markets.

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All Financial History for Beginners

I was really hoping I could recommend The Ascent of Money by Niall Ferguson as a kind of catch-all Beginners book, in the spirit of my Beginners articles. Its subtitle is “A Financial History of the World,” after all. But I have to say it fell short of my expectations, although it would still make a nice gift. And although it has 360 pages, the spacing is wide and the margins are big, so you could buy it in the morning, read it in the afternoon, and still wrap it up in time for Christmas.

The book proceeds through a series of historical lessons, one for each major asset class – money (meaning primarily bank credit), bonds, stocks, insurance, real estate, and “international finance.” And there is certainly a lot of fascinating history to learn in there. For example, although I spent seven years dealing exclusively with insurance companies, and I knew about the usage of insurance in early Renaissance Italy, I had never read the story of the Scottish Widows’ Fund, the first true insurance fund designed to be self-financing in perpetuity. Nor did I know how Nathan Rothschild made a fortune betting that UK government bonds would rise in the years after Waterloo (because the government’s need for borrowing would decline). And the book does touch on many of the historical parallels you have probably been reading about during the past few months, from the Great Depression to the S&L crisis to Japan’s lost decade and the emerging markets crisis of 1997-98. Ferguson is also an excellent writer, and even your friends and relatives who are less excited by topics such as bond yields and the money supply will probably find most of it enjoyable going.

But the problem is that the book is just too short. Niall Ferguson made his reputation writing some very big books about considerably smaller topics. Reading this smallish book about an enormous topic, I got the feeling that he wasn’t allowing himself enough pages to deal with each topic in the depth he would have liked. This has two consequences. First, even though he is clearly writing for the general reader, there are places where he doesn’t take enough care to define his terms, and where he is bound to lose large parts of his audience. For example, describing the capital structure of what would become the Mississippi Company, which mixed new shareholder’s capital, billets d’etat issued by Louis XIV, and perpetual bonds, he lost me. So if you really want to understand the shift of European governments from confiscatory taxation to borrowing, you’ll need to look elsewhere.

Second, The Ascent of Money necessarily treats in just a few pages topics on which entire books – and quite long ones, sometimes – have been written, and if you’ve read those books, you’ll find the summaries here pale by comparison. For example, Ferguson makes Enron (on which see The Smartest Guys in the Room) into an emblematic bubble company (“the Mississippi Company all over again”), the bubble this time inflated by cheap money, courtesy of the Federal Reserve. I think calling Enron a bubble company is a only part of the story, since much of what it did – dating back to the early 1990s – was accounting fraud that needed no bubble to exist (although the bubble certainly magnified the scale of the take); Pets.com would be more of a pure bubble company. Similarly, Ferguson’s account of Long-Term Capital Management emphasizes the quantitative arbitrage premise of the fund; but the big bet that killed LTCM was not arbitrage by any means, but a one-sided bet against volatility – a bet that was informed by quantitative analysis (volatility was high, so LTCM thought it would go down) but was ultimately a gambler’s bet, as described in When Genius Failed.

As for the current crisis, Ferguson had the fortune or misfortune of finalizing the book in May, and so missed out on the events of the last few months. At the time he was writing, it still seemed like the crisis would only hasten the day when China would overtake the U.S. as the world’s largest economy (“at the time of writing Asia seems scarcely affected by the credit crunch in the U.S.”). Which, of course, only shows how unpredictable the events of the last four months have been, that China is now facing its most serious labor unrest of the last ten years. Hey, I didn’t see it coming, either. As a historian, the narrative he wants to tell is one of a shift in the balance of economic power from the U.S. to China. Of course, it still may happen – we just won’t know for a couple of decades, at least.

We Have a Winner?

After seeing dozens of mortgage proposals emerge over the past several months, there are news stories that Larry Summers and the Obama economic team are converging on an unlikely candidate: the proposal by Glenn Hubbard and Christopher Mayer first launched on the op-ed page of the Wall Street Journal on October 2. Hubbard and Mayer published a summary of the plan in the WSJ last week; a longer version of the op-ed is available from their web site; and you can also download the full paper, with all the models.

Continue reading “We Have a Winner?”

When Consumers Get Depressed

The Return of Depression Economics, by Paul Krugman, is certain to be one of the most gifted books this holiday season; that’s what happens when you combine a Nobel Prize with a massive economic crisis and book with the word “depression” in the title. Here’s another reason to buy it for someone, as I found out: it’s so short you can read it in a couple of hours before wrapping it up.

The title of the book refers broadly to the recurrence of a need to deal with Depression-style economic threats, a theme that originally (in the 1999 edition) referred to the emerging markets crisis of 1997-98 and and the stagnation in Japan caused by the collapse of their housing bubble at the beginning of the 1990s. More particularly, however, it refers to the problems brought on by a collapse in economic demand – “insufficient private spending to make use of the available productive capacity,” as Krugman puts it. And it seems clear that that’s where we are today. The Case-Shiller index of housing prices reached its peak in real terms sometime in 2006, but the economy continued to grow until the end of 2007, even as housing prices fell significantly. Although the negative wealth effect of falling housing must have had some effect, people still wanted to spend. When the severe phase of the crisis began in September 2008, it was widely described as a credit crunch, meaning that reductions in the supply of credit were making it difficult for borrowers to get the money they needed, either for investment or consumption. Today, however, as Simon has said before, falling demand for credit may be just as big a problem. People just don’t want to borrow money any more, and if that’s the case, then increasing the supply of credit (by funneling cash into banks) will have only a limited effect, as we’ve seen. This is what Krugman finds most worrying about the current situation: the “loss of policy traction,” in which even dramatic moves by the Fed have only a limited impact ont he real economy.

He doesn’t quite come out and say it in so many words, but a lot of Krugman’s story has to do with what might be called psychology. He describes how economic crises may be the product of poor governmental policies and weak economic fundamentals – or they may be entirely the product of panics that have the very real effect of destroying wealth and setting countries back for years. Seen from this perspective, the scale of the current crisis may not have any proportional relationship to the fundamental flaws of our economy (or the global economy). It may simply reflect the fact that the scale, liquidity, and leverage of the global financial system have made it possible for panics to have much greater damage than they did in the past. (I know we’re still not dealing with anything on the scale of the Great Depression, but while the financial system was simpler then, it also had a simpler flaw – the lack of deposit insurance – and a simpler mistake – the failure to expand monetary policy in response to the downturn.)

The fact that you are reading this blog probably means that you would not learn a lot about the current crisis from Krugman’s book (especially if you’ve already read his article in The New York Review of Books), but you might learn something about the crisis of the 1990s, and the dynamics of currency crises. In 1997-98, multiple unrelated emerging market countries suffered panics and currency crises, and the response of “Washington” (the U.S. and the IMF) was to demand fiscal austerity – higher interest rates, lower government spending, higher taxes – in exchange for bailout loans. Now, of course, when large parts of wealthy country economies need to be bailed out, few people are calling for austerity; in the U.S., liberals and (most) conservatives differ only on whether the deficit should be increased through government spending or through tax cuts. Ten years ago, perhaps the austerity argument was defensible: in order for countries to gain credibility (and be able to pay back their loans), they needed to improve their government balance sheets. And at the time, the U.S. could be confident that reduced purchasing power in Thailand, South Korea, and Russia would have little effect on our economy. Today, however, the entire world is facing a steep downturn, and an economic stimulus will be most effective if it is roughly coordinated across countries, including emerging markets. So far the IMF appears to be using a gentler hand than last time, although so far most countries are attempting to steer clear unless absolutely necessary. The fact is that preventing an economic collapse in emerging markets will be an important of our recovery this time, both because of the importance of foreign trade and because of the amount of cross-border investment (think about the massive inflows into international stock funds in the past ten years).

In any case, it’s a quick read, and for those who are nervous about Krugman’s politics they make only a very brief entry near the end.

Managing Financial Innovation

Financial innovation tends to be a bit of a bad word these days. But while I and many other people are in favor of an overhaul of our regulatory system, that still leaves open the question of how the system should be managed.

A reader pointed me to a 2005 paper by Zvi Bodie and Robert Merton on the “Design of Financial Systems.” They argue that neoclassical finance theory – frictionless markets, rational agents, efficient outcomes – needs to be combined with two additional perspectives: an institutional approach that focus on the structural aspects of the financial system that introduce friction and may lead to non-efficient outcomes; and a behavioral approach that focuses on the ways in which and the conditions under which economic actors are not rational (see my post on bubbles, for example). The paper walks through examples of how to think about some real problems we face, such as the fact that households are increasingly being forced to make important decisions about retirement savings, but generally lack the knowledge and skills to make those decisions. One of their arguments is that while institutional design may not matter in a pure neoclassical world, it does matter in the world of irrational actors: deposit insurance to stop bank runs is an obvious example.

Some of the content may be tough going, but in general the paper offers one perspective on how to think about the relationships between markets, institutions, and individual behavior that make up our financial system.

We Are All in This Together

Dani Rodrik has a short, clear post on (a) why countries are tempted to engage in protectionism during recessions and (b) why they shouldn’t. It only uses 1st-semester macroeconomics. The bottom line is that the preferred outcome is for all countries to engage in fiscal stimulus at the same time. The hitch is that most of the developing world can’t afford to. The implication is that it is in the interests of the wealthy countries to find a way to support the developing world.

How the SEC Could Have Regulated Subprime Mortgages

From a new paper (link below):

Kafka would have loved this story: According to our current understanding of U.S. law there is far better consumer protection for people who play the stock market than for people who are duped into buying a house with an exotically structured subprime mortgage, even when the mortgage instrument is immediately packaged and sold as part of a security.

The crux of the matter is that securities transactions – notably, the sale of a security to a customer by a broker – are governed by SEC regulations, which impose a fiduciary relationship on the broker, meaning, among other things, that the broker can only sell financial products that are suitable for that customer. However, no such rule governs the relationship of a homebuyer to a mortgage broker or company, meaning that behavior by the latter must be actually fraudulent before it can be sanctioned.

Jonathan Macey, Maureen O’Hara, and Gabe Rosenberg (two of whom are at my very own Yale Law School) have a new paper (abstract and download available) arguing not only that mortgage brokers should have a fiduciary responsibility to their customers, but that they already do under two reasonable interpretations of existing SEC regulations. (It has to do with whether a complex subprime mortgage is already a security or, failing that, whether it is related to a security transaction.) This means that the SEC could have been regulating these things all along.

More Danger for the Eurozone?

Back in the exciting days of October, Peter, Simon, and I wrote an op-ed in The Guardian about the potential for cracks to appear in the Eurozone, even possibly leading to one or more countries withdrawing from the euro. With so many other things to worry about, this scenario didn’t get a lot of attention. Since then, pressures have been slowly building. For example, the spread between the 10-year bonds of Greece and Germany has grown from around 30 basis points during most of the decade to over 1.5% now. (The picture below is from last week.)

Greece-Germany

According to an FT chart (sorry, can’t find the link), Greece also has to raise 20.3% of its GDP in debt next year (the equivalent figure for the U.S. is 10.3%), so the spread should only get bigger.

The Eurozone is based on the idea that a single monetary policy can serve the interests of all of the member countries. The problem is that when macroeconomic conditions vary widely between countries, they will have different interests. In a severe crisis, some countries may be tempted to (a) engage in quantitative easing (of the sort the Fed is beginning to do) or (b) implement a large fiscal stimulus (of the sort that Pelosi, Reid, and Obama are about to do). (a) is impossible for a Eurozone member, and (b) is constrained by limits on deficit spending, although I believe those limits are honored more in the breach than in practice.

In any case, the potential problems are getting big enough that Martin Feldstein has weighed in as well. Hopefully this will draw more attention to the issue. It may still be a low probability, but the economic and political consequences of undoing the greatest step toward European integration in, oh, the last thousand years would be huge.