Author: Simon Johnson

A Trap Of Their Own Design

At this stage in the electoral cycle, Democrats should be running hard against big banks and their consequences.  Some roots of our current economic difficulties lie in the Clinton 1990s, but the real origins can be traced to the financial deregulation at the heart of the Reagan Revolution – and all the underlying problems became much worse in eight years of George W. Bush’s unique brand of excess and neglect.

The mismanagement of mammoth financial institutions over the past decade produced a crisis in September 2008 that required a substantial fiscal stimulus – among other bold government measures – simply to prevent the outbreak of a Second Great Depression.  That sensible fiscal response, plus the “automatic stabilizers” that worsen any budget (and help limit job losses) as the economy slows, will end up adding around 40 percentage points to our net national debt as a percent of GDP.  If you want to accuse the Obama administration of wantonly increasing the national debt – then let’s talk about the circumstances that required this fiscal policy.

The theme for the November midterms should be: Which part of the 8 million jobs lost [since December 2007] do you not understand?  The big banks must be reined in and forced to break themselves up, or we’ll head directly for another such crisis

Instead, the Democrats have fallen into a legislative and electoral trap that – amazingly – they built for themselves. Continue reading “A Trap Of Their Own Design”

The “Miracle” Still Goes On For Someone…

This guest post is by Ivo Pezzuto, Professor at the Swiss Management Center University (SMCU) in Zurich, Switzerland, and an experienced observer of the global financial services industry.

I share the analysis of most economists and observers that the following are among the main causes of the current global financial crisis:

  • the U.S. Federal Reserve’s low interest rate policy at the beginning of the last decade, the resulting credit euphoria of both lenders and borrowers;
  • the more ”relaxed” credit initiation and control policies and procedures of lenders;
  • the “exotic” innovative features of some mortgage lending products;
  • the overwhelmingly optimistic view of future house prices which prevailed in the market that has led to both the housing and the mortgage lending bubbles;
  • the widespread use of badly controlled (OTC trading) innovative financial engineering tools (i.e., derivatives, securitizations, CDS, CDO, MBS, RMBS, CLO, etc.).
  • Imbalances, exchange rates and interest rates differences between the US and other emerging economies and the resulting speculative trading and arbitrages. Continue reading “The “Miracle” Still Goes On For Someone…”

Too Big to Regulate?

This guest post was submitted by Peter Fox-Penner, a leading expert on regulation at The Brattle Group.  The views expressed herein are those of the author alone. 

At present, the debate among economists over whether our financial regulations should protect institutions on the basis that they are “too big to fail” (TBTF) still rages.  Like many other economists, I distrust the reasoning behind the TBTF justification and rue the fact that the measures taken to prop up the U.S. financial system have made the largest banks even larger, while small banks are failing at record levels.  In my first guest post I argued patchwork attempts to strengthen financial regulation without a “clean sheet” review were likely to be inadequate.

In this second post I look past short term bailouts and address the broader issue of establishing regulation of TBTF firms.  Policymakers are faced with challenge of establishing a large regulator that retains the specialized expertise needed to manage complex markets – specialization more often found in a network of smaller agencies.  To do so they will need to address the size and complexity of the financial sector itself.  As before,  I turn to examples from the utility industry, specifically the establishment and repeal of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA), that provide lessons for crafting regulation of complex industries.

Continue reading “Too Big to Regulate?”

The Obama Financial Tax Is A Start, Not The End

The flurry of interest this week around ways to tax Big Banks is important, because officials in the US are – for the first time – recognizing that reckless risk-taking in our banking system is dangerous and undesirable.

But the possibility of a tax on bonuses or on “excess profits” that are large relative to the financial system should not distract us from the more fundamental issues. Continue reading “The Obama Financial Tax Is A Start, Not The End”

The Citi Never Weeps

On the first day of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Phil Angelides demonstrated a gift for powerful and memorable metaphor: accusing Goldman Sachs of essentially selling defective cars and then taking out insurance on the buyers.  Lloyd Blankfein and the other CEOs looked mildly uncomfortable, and this image reinforces the case for a tax on big banks – details to be provided by the president later today.

But the question is: How to keep up the pressure and move the debate forward?  If we stop with a few verbal slaps on the wrist and a relatively minor new levy, then we have achieved basically nothing.  We need people more broadly to grasp the dangerous financial “risk system” we have created and to agree that it needs to be dismantled completely.

One way to do this would be for the Commission to call key people from Citigroup to testify. Continue reading “The Citi Never Weeps”

“I Do Not Blame The Regulators”

Jamie Dimon has all the best lines.  In May 2009, he told JPMorgan Chase shareholders that 2008 was probably “our finest year ever.”  That was before he thought about profits for 2009.

And today he told to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, “I want to be clear that I do not blame the regulators.  The responsibility for a company’s actions rests with the company’s management” (p. 9).

This is true enough – and something to reflect on during bonus season.  But at a deeper level, the crisis of 2008-09 and our continued dangerous financial system are very much the fault of our regulators.  Continue reading ““I Do Not Blame The Regulators””

Drill, Baby, Drill: Reviewing The Advice To The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission

The NYT has a collection of potential questions for the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) to ask four of the country’s leading bankers today.

Some of the proposed questions are technical or even philosophical.  These are interesting, but hardly likely to be effective.

I like where Yves Smith is going: what kind of bonuses were paid for trades on which firms ultimately lost money?  Bill Cohan and David Walker, coming from very different perspectives, are also pushing on issues related to compensation structure in general and bonuses in particular.

The real issue, of course, is the nature of the risk system itself.  But this is a big abstract question – and not suited to these kind of hearings.  The Commission needs to find concrete issues that people can relate to much more broadly, and bonuses are very much in the line of fire.  The fact that the 2009 bonuses are already in the works – and eerily, but not coincidentally, parallel to the 2007 bonuses – is going to make this hard for the bankers to spin.

Serious debate is just beginning – drill down into how bankers at Too Big To Fail firms really pay themselves, and you will be amazed at what you start to see more clearly.

By Simon Johnson

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: Ready For A Breakthrough

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) holds its first public session on Wednesday.  When the FCIC was established in May, the prevailing wisdom was that the hearings and final report would be dry and rather inconclusive.

But the debate around Big Banks has started to shifted markedly, particularly in recent weeks.  Anger about bonuses is increasingly expressed by the most mild-mannered policy experts.  The administration itself is proposing some sort of excess profits tax on the biggest banks.  And – most important – our top bankers have their tin ears prominently on display.

In the Daily Beast, I suggest exactly how the Commission can put this moment to productive use.  The point is to find for rather dull and difficult technical material to become names, dates, and numbers that catch the popular imagination – and provide a genuine warning.  The most obvious and reasonable way to do this is by drilling down into the details of the Wall Street compensation system, then and now – the more you dig, the more you understand why we are heading for trouble.

By Simon Johnson

Bank Tax Arrives

The Obama administration tipped its hand today – they are planning a new tax of some form on the banking sector.  But the details are deliberately left vague – perhaps “not completely decided” would be a better description.

The NYT’s Room for Debate is running some reactions and suggestions.  The administration is finally getting a small part of its act together – unfortunately too late to make a difference for the current round of bonuses. 

We know there is a G20 process underway looking at ways to measure “excess bank profits” and, with American leadership, this could lead towards a more reasonable tax system for finance.  In the meantime, my point is that taxing bonuses – under today’s circumstances – is not as bad as many people argue, particularly as it lets you target the biggest banks. 

By Simon Johnson

The Case For A Supertax On Big Bank Bonuses

The big banks are pre-testing their main messages for bonus season, which starts in earnest next week.  Their payouts relative to profits will be “record lows”, their people won’t make as much as in 2007 (except for Goldman), and they will pay a higher proportion of the bonus in stock than usual.  Behind the scenes, leading executives are still arguing out the details of the optics.

As they justify their pay packages, the bankers open up a broader relevant question: How much bonus do they deserve in this situation?  After all, bonus time is when you decide who made what kind of relative contribution to your bottom line – and you are able to recognize unusually strong achievement. 

Seen in these terms, the answer is easy: people working at our largest banks – say over $100 bn in total assets – should get zero bonus for 2009. Continue reading “The Case For A Supertax On Big Bank Bonuses”

Countdown to January 18: Goldman’s Bonus Day

Sources say that Goldman Sachs’ bonuses will be announced on Monday, January 18, and actually paid sometime between February 4 and February 7.  In previous years, the bonuses were paid in early January – but the financial year shifted when Goldman became a bank holding company.

For critics of the company and its fellow travelers, the timing could not be better.

Anxiety levels about the financial sector are on the increase, even on Capitol Hill.  The tension between high profits in banking and stress in the rest of the economy becomes increasingly a topic of discussion across the nation.

And you are hard pressed to find any government official who has not by now woken up – in private – to the dangerous hubris of big banks.  To add insult to injury (and many other insults), the Bank for International Settlements is holding a meeting to discuss excessive risk-taking in the financial sector; according to CNBC Thursday morning, Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman and Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase were invited but did not show up (they really are very busy).

The smart strategy for Goldman in this context would be to pay no bonus for 2009 (in cash, stock or any other form), but this is not possible for three reasons. Continue reading “Countdown to January 18: Goldman’s Bonus Day”

Good Idea Coming

One striking aspect of the public debate about the future of derivatives – and how best to regulate them – is that almost all the available experts work for one of the major broker-dealers.

There are a couple of prominent and credible voices among people who used to work in the industry, including Frank Partnoy and Satyajit Das.  And there are a number of top academics, but if they help run trading operations they are often unwilling to go on-the-record and if they don’t trade, they lack legitimacy on Capitol Hill and in the media.

The Obama administration is criticized from various angles – including by me and, even more pointedly, by Matt Taibbi – for employing so many people from the finance sector in prominent policy positions.  But, the administration pushes back: Where else can we find people with sufficient expertise? Continue reading “Good Idea Coming”

Hoenig Talks Sense On Casino Banks

Thomas Hoenig, President of the Kansas City Fed, has been talking sense for a long time about the dangers posed by “too big to fail” banks.  On Tuesday, he went a step further: “Beginning to break them, to dismember them, is a fair thing to consider.”

Hoenig joins the ranks of highly respected policymakers pushing for priority action on TBTF, including some combination of size reduction and/or Glass-Steagall type separation of casino banks and boring banks.

As Paul Volcker continues to hammer home his points, more policymakers will come on board.  Mervyn King – one of the most respected central bankers in the world – moves global technocratic opinion.  Smart people on Capitol Hill begin to understand that this is an issue that can win or lose elections. Continue reading “Hoenig Talks Sense On Casino Banks”

Still No To Bernanke

We first expressed our opposition to the reconfirmation of Ben Bernanke as chairman of the Fed on December 24th and again here on Sunday.  Since then a wide range of smart economists have argued – at the American Economic Association meetings in Atlanta – that Bernanke should be allowed to stay on.

I’ve heard at least six distinct points.  None of them are convincing.

  1. Bernanke is a great academic.  True, but not relevant to the question at hand.
  2. Bernanke ran an inspired rescue operation for the US financial system from September 2008.  Also true, but this is not now the issue we face.  We’re looking for someone who can clean up and reform the system – not someone to bail it out further. Continue reading “Still No To Bernanke”

“All Serious Economists Agree”

The most remarkable statement I heard at the American Economics Association meeting over the past few days came from an astute observer – not an economist, but someone whose job involves talking daily to leading economists, politicians, and financial industry professionals.

He claims “all serious economists agree” that Too Big To Fail banks are a huge problem that must be addressed with some urgency. 

He also emphasized that politicians are completely unwilling to take on this issue.  On this point, I agree – but is there really such unanimity among economists? Continue reading ““All Serious Economists Agree””