Year: 2010

Will The Volcker Rule Really Be Enforced?

By Simon Johnson

The Financial Stability Oversight Council has put out a request for comments on the Volcker Rule – if you write to them soon, they may actually listen.

One big issue is whether there will be high frequency monitoring of trades by big banks – potentially enabling regulators to know if the “no proprietary trading” rule is being violated. The default approach is probably to have a hands-off, light touch – pretty much continuing our recent and not-so-distinguished traditions with regard to supervising banks.

I go through the issues in more detail – including who seems to be on what side within the government – in a Bloomberg column that appeared this evening.

Thoughts On The Macroeconomic Impact of Goldman Sachs

By Peter Boone and Simon Johnson

The influential Goldman Sachs economist Jan Hatzius has a new research note out (with Sven Jari Stehn), “Thoughts on the Macroeconomic Impact of Basel III,” arguing that the move to raise capital standards for banks will put a serious crimp in growth in the United States – knocking 1.5 to 2 percent off gross domestic product in the next few years. Their findings are questionable, but in any case we should broaden the discussion to consider exactly how banks like Goldman Sachs affect our macroeconomic dynamics going forward – particularly if they are able to effectively lobby against higher capital. Growth based on risky banking has a tendency to prove illusory.

There are three issues. First, what is the short-term impact of raising capital requirements? Second, how should capital be increased? And third, and perhaps most important, do we really need global banks like Goldman Sachs to operate in their recent “high risk – highly variable returns” mode?

In their note, which is not in the public domain, Mr. Hatzius and Mr. Stehn are willing to acknowledge that raising capital standards can help make banks safer and that this is good for sustained growth over a sufficiently long period of time (think a decade or more), as the Bank for International Settlements suggests. But they make the case that raising capital – at least in the form that this is likely to take place – can slow growth over the next several years. Continue reading “Thoughts On The Macroeconomic Impact of Goldman Sachs” →

The Government Does Have Something To Do with It

This guest post on the relationship of business and government comes to us from Lawrence B. Glickman, chair of the History Department at the University of South Carolina; the author, most recently, of Buying Power: A History of Consumer Activism in America; and an occasional contributor to this blog.

One of the most telling statements of our political era, –made ten years ago this week by Dick Cheney during his Vice Presidential debate with Joe Lieberman on October 5, 2000, –was actually a misstatement that went largely unnoticed. And therein lies an important lesson about the place of government in our political culture.

In response to the Democratic nominee Lieberman’’s jibe that Cheney had profited handsomely from the job he had recently departed as CEO of the Haliburton Corporation, the Republican nominee replied, “”I can tell you, Joe, the government had absolutely nothing to do with it.”” Amid the laughter and applause of the audience, Leiberman chuckled good-naturedly and joked about joining the private sector himself.

Following the debate, media analysts focused on what the New York Times called Cheney’s “avuncular self-confidence” but, like his opponent, they largely passed over the fact that his statement was a whopping lie.  Despite his denial and his antigovernment rhetoric, the company Cheney ran depended on billions of dollars of government contracts and loan guarantees. It would not be an exaggeration to say that government was Haliburton’’s primary source of support.

Continue reading “The Government Does Have Something To Do with It” →

Why China Is Unwilling to Revalue the Yuan

The following guest post was contributed by Ian Lamont, an MIT Sloan Fellow. He was previously the managing editor of the Industry Standard, and has also researched China’s state-run media and communications policies.

For years, China has been subject to enormous external pressure to increase the value of its currency, or let it float on the open market. While doing so might relieve pressure on foreign economies by boosting their exports and reducing trade deficits, it runs counter to Beijing’s domestic priorities, which involve doing everything it can to preserve economic growth and domestic stability, and by extension, its hold on political power.

All countries exploit the dynamics between their political and economic systems. But China’s situation is exceptional. For three decades, the government of the People’s Republic of China has perpetuated a grand political dream, claiming a single-party political mandate from the Communist ideals espoused by Mao Zedong, while simultaneously drawing power from the capitalist canon. Beijing has been able to pull it off, largely through the promise of spreading wealth and opportunities to even the poorest of villages and maintaining benefits for cadres and workers in state-owned enterprises which cannot easily be absorbed into the capitalist system. A high rate of GDP growth is required year after year to maintain this state of affairs.

A sudden change in the value of the Yuan could have the effect of throwing a wrench into the works, potentially setting off a chain reaction of factory closures and layoffs across the interconnected networks that drive China’s export-oriented economy. In the short term, China might be able manipulate legislation, the banking sector, and welfare levers to prop up key industries or regions. But in the long term, it is uncertain if these steps would be enough to preserve social stability or continued loyalty to the Communist Party.  Continue reading “Why China Is Unwilling to Revalue the Yuan” →

TARP Is Gone – But May Soon Be Back

The Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, is over – more specifically, its legal authority expires on Sunday, so it cannot be used for new “bailout” activities (although legacy programs, with money already disbursed, could last 5 to 10 years.)

The first draft of its history, looking back over the past two years, may be this: TARP was an essential piece of a necessary evil – that is, it saved the American financial system from collapse — but it was implemented in a way that was excessively favorable to the very bankers who had presided over the collapse. And this sets up exactly the wrong incentives as we head into the next credit cycle. Continue reading “TARP Is Gone – But May Soon Be Back” →

Bad Arguments Against Tax “Increases”

By James Kwak

Last week, a professor making more than $250,000 per year (with his wife’s income) put up a blog post (since taken down) criticizing President Obama for wanting to “raise” his taxes.* The post basically said, after all of their basic expenses, “we are just getting by despite seeming to be rich.” If his taxes go up, he says he will have to cut back on spending, which will depress the economy, or perhaps even sell his house or cars, which will depress those asset markets. The problem, he argues, is that the tax “increases” won’t affect the true super-rich, because they use tax dodges to avoid paying taxes; instead, they will just hurt the economy.

This post has been the target of some howitzers on the Internet, mainly focused on the professor’s income and expenses, but I wanted to raise a few more general policy points.

First, it’s just not true that the rich will reduce their spending dollar-for-dollar as their taxes go up. The reason that tax cuts are a lousy form of stimulus applies in reverse: just as extra cash leads to more saving, less cash leads to less saving. And this is especially true for the rich, who have more slack in their budgets. There might be individual rich households that will reduce their spending dollar-for-dollar, but in aggregate it just won’t happen.

Continue reading “Bad Arguments Against Tax “Increases”” →

Can Someone Explain Facebook Credits to Me?

By James Kwak

The recent New York Times story on Facebook Credits was just one of a slew of articles that have been coming out recently on this topic. (Hint: When that happens, it’s usually because the company in question is putting on a PR campaign, which means they are pushing stories to the media in an attempt to build buzz.) According to the generally positive reporting, Credits are “a virtual currency system that some day could turn into a multibillion-dollar business.”

As far as I can make out,* Credits are points that you can buy with real money and that are stored with your Facebook account data on the mother ship in Palo Alto (just like your bank keeps track of the Dollars you have on account there). You can use Credits to pay for a variety of stuff in Facebook apps, and Facebook takes a cut (currently thirty percent) of the value of any transaction using Credits. The story is that in the long run, you may be able to use Credits to buy anything, not just stuff on Facebook, positioning Facebook as a potential leader in electronic payments.

Continue reading “Can Someone Explain Facebook Credits to Me?” →

Foreclosure Wave Hits Cash Buyers, Too

By James Kwak

Since most of you probably read Calculated Risk, you’ve probably seen the Sun Sentinel story of the man in Florida who paid cash for a house–and still lost it in a foreclosure. Not only that, but he bought the house in a short sale in December 2009, the foreclosure sale happened in July 2010, and only then did he learn about the foreclosure proceeding.

Even after that,

“Grodensky said he spent months trying to figure out what happened, but said his questions to Bank of America and to the law firm Florida Default Law Group that handled the foreclosure have not been answered. Florida Default Law Group could not be reached for comment, despite several attempts by phone and e-mail. . . .

“It wasn’t until last week, when Grodensky brought his problem to the attention of the Sun Sentinel, that it began to be resolved.”

Bank of America now says it will correct the error “at its own expense.” How gracious of them.

If the legal system simply allows Bank of America to correct errors, at cost and with ordinary damages, after they happen, this type of abuse will only get worse. There’s obviously no incentive for banks not to make mistakes, and as a result they will behave as aggressively as possible at every opportunity possible. Yes, this was probably incompetence, not malice, on the part of the bank. But if you don’t force companies to pay for the consequences of their incompetence, they will remain willfully incompetent, and the end result will be the same.

After The Recession: What Next For the Fed?

By Simon Johnson

The Federal Reserve was created in 1913 to help limit the impact of financial panics. It took a while for the Fed to achieve that goal, but after World War II – with a great deal of help from other parts of the federal government – the Fed hit its stride. Today the Fed has not only lost that touch but, given the way our political and financial system currently operates, its own policies exacerbate the cycle of overexuberance and incautious lending that will bring on the next major crisis (and presumably another severe recession).

Sudden loss of confidence in the financial system was not uncommon toward the end of the 19th century, and while the private sector was able to stave off complete disaster largely by itself, the tide turned in 1907. In that instance J.P. Morgan could stand firm only because, behind the scenes, his team received a large loan from the United States Treasury (on this formative episode, see The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned From the Market’s Perfect Storm by Robert F. Bruner and Sean D. Carr). Leaders of the banking system realized they needed help moving forward, and there was general agreement that the widespread collapse of financial intermediaries was not in the broader social interest. The question of the day naturally became: How much government oversight would bankers have to accept in return for the creation of a modern central bank? Continue reading “After The Recession: What Next For the Fed?” →

Elizabeth Warren: The Right Appointment At The Right Time

By Simon Johnson

The case for appointing Elizabeth Warren to set up the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was, at the end of the day, overwhelming.  She had the original idea, she helped build political support, and her own credentials have been only strengthened by her work as head of the Congressional Oversight Panel for TARP.  On Friday, the president will reportedly appoint Professor Warren as an assistant to the president and special adviser to the Treasury Secretary, with the task of setting up and initially running the CFPB.

Some of Ms. Warren’s supporters think this move is something of a half-measure – they would have preferred a conventional nomination, with all the fanfare of a classic confirmation battle in the Senate.  There is something to be said for that, but the interim appointment route is by far the best way forward for three reasons. Continue reading “Elizabeth Warren: The Right Appointment At The Right Time” →

Basel III: The Fatal Flaw

By Simon Johnson

The international discussion among government officials regarding bank reform is, at an informal level, going better than you might think.  Top people in the “official sector” are increasingly willing to confront the banking lobby and even refute its more egregious claims, particularly the completely erroneous notion that making banks safer – by requiring them to hold more capital – would actually hurt the broader economy and undermine growth.

Unfortunately, the structured intergovernmental process that actually changes the rules around banks – known as Basel III (or “Basel 3”) – was rushed to an unsatisfactory conclusion last weekend.  The US and other countries with major financial centers will need to add substantial additional capital requirements at national levels if these new rules are to be at all effective. Continue reading “Basel III: The Fatal Flaw” →

Brady Bonds For The Eurozone, Starting With Ireland

By Peter Boone and Simon Johnson. This post comprises the opening paragraphs of a longer article available for free and without advertizing at Project Syndicate.

Today’s conventional view of the eurozone is that the crisis is over – the intense, often existential concern earlier this year about the common currency’s future has been assuaged, and everything now is back under control.

This is completely at odds with the facts. European bond markets are again delivering a chilling message to global policymakers. With bonds of “peripheral” eurozone nations continuing to fall in value, the risk of Irish, Greek, and Portuguese sovereign defaults is higher than ever.

This comes despite the combined bailout package that the European Union, International Monetary Fund, and European Central Bank created for Greece in May, and despite the ECB’s continuing program of buying peripheral EU countries’ bonds. Heading into its annual meetings in a few weeks (followed by the G-20 summit in Seoul in November), the IMF is bowing to pressure to drop ever-larger sums into the EU with ever-fewer conditions.

Indeed, official rhetoric has turned once again to trying to persuade markets to ignore reality. Patrick Honohan, the governor of Ireland’s central bank, has labeled the interest rates on Irish government bonds “ridiculous” (meaning ridiculously high), and IMF researchers argue that default in Ireland and Greece is “unnecessary, undesirable, and unlikely.”

…..

Read the rest of this article, with links to sources, at Project Syndicate: click here (or just use this address: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/johnson12/English).  It’s free and no advertizing is involved; more about Project Syndicate here.

The Importance of the 1970s

By James Kwak

It isn’t often that I read two books in a row that both cite Alexis de Tocqueville, probably my favorite Social Studies 10 author (although he was far from my favorite at the time). In Third World America, Arianna Huffington cited Tocqueville’s observation that democracy should promote the interests of “the greatest possible number”; as I pointed out, this is clearly no longer true in America (if it ever was). In Winner-Take-All Politics,* Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson explain why.

In 13 Bankers, Simon and I argue that the key forces behind the transformation of the financial sector and the resulting financial crisis were political, not simply economic. To this argument, at least two good questions spring to mind: Why finance? And why then? Hacker and Pierson have good answers to both of these questions. Their answer to the latter question is better than (though not inconsistent with) the answer we gave in our book.

Continue reading “The Importance of the 1970s” →