Tag Archives: industrial policy

Guest Post: Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth

This post was written by my friend Ilya Podolyako, an occasional contributor here and a third-year student (though not for much longer!) at the Yale Law School.

In the last couple of days, a few disparate news pieces attracted my interest. First, as I mentioned in my last post on industrial policy, an accelerating, worldwide decrease in consumer disposable incomes is beginning to percolate through the manufacturing sector. As a result, Caterpillar, DuPont, and United Technologies posted double-digit declines in sales. Second, reports surfaced that Fiat, Obama’s designated buyer for Chrysler LLC, was looking instead to purchase GM’s Opel division. Third, Sen. Diane Feinstein (D-CA) introduced a “cash-for-clunkers” bill that would provide a credit of up to $4500 toward the price of a fuel-efficient car for individuals or government-owned fleet operators who turn in a low-mpg “clunker.”

What do all these data points have to do with each other? In my mind, they highlight the need for a structured approach to the U.S. industrial sector. The current policies are completely random and occasionally conflicting, which is not surprising, considering that they are coming from different branches of government who seem reluctant to talk to each other. For example, the purpose of the Feinstein bill seems to be to support the auto industry by lowering the effective price of a new car while also boosting aggregate fuel efficiency. Presumably, these measures would help the ailing American automakers transition from making money on SUVs to making money on hybrids. Yet in this context, a government-financed sale of Chrysler to Fiat doesn’t make very much sense. If we are concerned about rescuing the American auto industry from the bottom up, why are we selling bits and pieces of this industry to foreign companies? Imagine if GM, Chrysler, and Ford did not exist – in this world, the government could surely find a better way of spending money to combat climate change than paying Toyota and Honda to chop 20% off the sale price of a new car. Just because other countries do it, doesn’t mean we should too.

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Guest Post: A Closer Look at Industrial Policy

This guest post is by occasional contributor Ilya Podolyako, a third-year student at the Yale Law School and an executive editor of the Yale Journal on Regulation.

In my last post, I compared Obama’s plan for the automakers to that of the Chinese government. I concluded that the two shared goals, but that these goals fit poorly into the traditional American ethos of free enterprise. For better or worse, the administration will have to remedy this mismatch sometime soon, either by letting the automakers fail or by openly stating that jobs, national pride, and a green fleet justify a government-backed industry.

Some of the comments to that piece strongly favored the latter course of action. Accordingly, I think it is worthwhile to take a normative look at directed industrial policy generally. In the abstract sense, this system is the opposite of laissez-faire capitalism – the government owns enterprises and dictates both the nature and quantity of their output. This description naturally evokes images of the USSR, Cuba, or the People’s Republic of China (before 1992), all countries with “command” economies. The distinctive characteristic of these nations, however, was not the presence of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) per se, but the absence of a legal, noticeable private sector.

Countries like Sweden, South Korea (before 1988), and, indeed, the modern China have demonstrated that directed industrial policy is not an all-or-nothing game.

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