Tag Archives: economics

Taxes

But, I hear you saying (and emailing) after my last few posts, higher taxes are bad for the economy because people don’t work as hard, making the pie smaller for everyone.

Yes, that’s what it says in the textbook. But the issue is more complicated than that. Look at this, for example:

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How Supposed Free-Market Theorists Destroyed Free-Market Theory

This guest post was contributed by Dan Geldon, a fellow at the Roosevelt Institute.  He is a former counsel at the Congressional Oversight Panel and a graduate of Harvard Law School.

Over the past year, there has been much discussion about how the financial crisis exposed weaknesses in free-market theory.  What has attracted less discussion is the extent to which the high priests of free-market theory themselves destroyed meaningful contracts and other bedrocks of functioning markets and, in the process, created the conditions for the theory’s weaknesses to emerge.

The story begins before Wall Street’s capture of Washington in the 1980s and 1990s and the deregulatory push that began around the same time.  In many ways, it started in 1944.

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The Limits of Economics

In honor of Mark Sanford and that other guy from Nevada, the fun-loving crowd over at Planet Money has been talking about the economics of adultery, and even got Simon to comment for them. I’m all in favor of a cute model, but I think this is as much a sign of the over-expansion of economic reason as anything else.

Chana Joffe-Walt’s post asks this question of the typical cheating politician: “Didn’t he know he’ll get caught, put his family through hell, exhaust all of us with the details and jeopardize his career? The costs are so great, how could the affair possibly be worth it?”

Well, that assumes that he was going to get caught, and the odds of being caught in an affair are one of those things that are inherently very difficult to measure (and that cheaters are likely to underestimate, because of selection bias). We can see the numerator, but we can’t see the denominator. It also assumes that trading your political career for a steamy affair is a bad outcome. On some level, don’t you suspect that a lot of male politicians do it because they want to impress women, and that affairs are part of the payoff of politics? And what sane person would really want to be in electoral politics anyway?

More generally, the motivations that drive people to want to have sex with people they are not married to, or otherwise live secret lives other than the one they are supposed to live, seem to me not only too complex for a Chicago-school rational-actor model, but even perhaps too complex for a behavioral model. That is, I suspect that this type of behavior involves multiple actors inside the same person: one person who combines the ambitious, values-touting politician; the typical middle-aged man going through a midlife crisis and hoping for someone to validate his self-image; and, of course, the lout who thinks with something other than his brain. I think combining those sides of the psyche into a single utility model and maximizing it subject to a budget constraint (be it money or time) is basically a fantasy. But economists these days wil stop at nothing.

By James Kwak

Causes: Economics

We are not short of causes for our current economic crisis.  The basic machinery of capitalism, including the process of making loans, did not work as it was supposed to.  Capital flows around the world proved much more destabilizing than even before (and we’ve seen some damaging capital flows over the past 200 years.)  And there are plenty of distinguished individuals with something to answer for, including anyone who thought they understood risk and how to manage it.

But perhaps the real problem lies even deeper, for example, either with a natural human tendency towards bubbles  or with how we think about the world.  All of our thinking about the economy – a vast abstract concept – has to be in some form of model, with or without mathematics.  And we should listen when a leading expert on a large set of influential models says (1) they are broken, and (2) this helped cause the crisis and – unless fixed – will lead to further instability down the road.

This is an important part of what my colleague, Daron Acemoglu, is saying in a new essay, “The Crisis of 2008: Structural Lessons for and from Economics.”  (If you like to check intellectual credentials, start here and if you don’t understand what I mean about models, look at his new book.)  To me there are three major points in his essay. Continue reading