By James Kwak
Last week BATS admitted that its software suffered from systematic problems for four years, failing to obtain the best execution price for about 250 customers and costing them about $400,000. That should be a giveaway: no self-respecting company would break the law just to steal $400,000 from its customers. This was a programming error, pure and simple.
Also last week, a RAND study revealed that, despite billions of dollars of investment, electronic medical records have done little to reduce costs for healthcare providers. This is more complicated than a simple programming error. The issue here is that projected savings of this kind are typically based on some model of how operations will be done in the future, and that model depends on perfectly-designed software functioning perfectly. Medical records systems apparently fall far short of this ideal: as the Times summarized, “The recent analysis was sharply critical of the commercial systems now in place, many of which are hard to use and do not allow doctors and patients to share medical information across systems.”
The common feature to these stories, however, is that big, complex, business software is really, really important—and a lot of it is bad. In many niches, it’s bad because there aren’t that many companies that serve that niche, it’s hard for customers to evaluate software that hasn’t been delivered and installed yet, and there are all sorts of legacy problems, particularly with integration to decades-old back-end systems. And most of the incentives favor closing the sale first rather than making sure the software works the way it should.
I don’t have much to add that I didn’t put in my Atlantic column on a similar topic last summer. Nothing has changed since then. So I’ll stop there.
Lessons of the Sequester
By James Kwak
The automatic sequester—the across-the-board cuts to discretionary programs that President Obama said “will not happen”—happened. The reason is simple and predictable: Republicans insist that the sequester be replaced entirely by spending cuts, while Democrats insist that tax increases must be part of the bargain.
One of the more controversial positions that I have taken, on several occasions over the past two years, was that the Bush tax cuts should have been allowed to expire completely. Now we see why.
In White House Burning, Simon and I calculated that the Bush tax cuts would be worth 2.5 percent of GDP in the long term. In other words, extending the tax cuts would mean that, in order to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio in the long term, we would have to come up with other tax increases or spending cuts equivalent to 2.5 percent of GDP—in today’s terms, about $400 billion per year.
Continue reading →
→ 26 Comments
Posted in Commentary