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	<title>Comments on: The Real Choice on Too Big to Fail</title>
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	<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/11/13/contingent-capital-too-big-to-fail/</link>
	<description>What happened to the global economy and what we can do about it</description>
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		<title>By: Bayard</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/11/13/contingent-capital-too-big-to-fail/#comment-33903</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bayard]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2009 01:49:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=5497#comment-33903</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[What a sad obfiscatory solution to the tight capital problem existing in the entire banking economy, but especially in the big boys.  Sure, let&#039;s let them solve their problem with what I believe will become the master smoking mirror.  God save us, if not Him, who (and I don&#039;t even believe, for God&#039;s sake!!)?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What a sad obfiscatory solution to the tight capital problem existing in the entire banking economy, but especially in the big boys.  Sure, let&#8217;s let them solve their problem with what I believe will become the master smoking mirror.  God save us, if not Him, who (and I don&#8217;t even believe, for God&#8217;s sake!!)?</p>
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		<title>By: eflotsam</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/11/13/contingent-capital-too-big-to-fail/#comment-33891</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[eflotsam]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2009 22:07:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=5497#comment-33891</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Who&#039;s going to buy these things?  They increase risk and decrease return.

The only people to profit will be the first one out the door when the building starts crumbling.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Who&#8217;s going to buy these things?  They increase risk and decrease return.</p>
<p>The only people to profit will be the first one out the door when the building starts crumbling.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Amazed</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/11/13/contingent-capital-too-big-to-fail/#comment-33807</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amazed]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2009 05:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=5497#comment-33807</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Taunter hit the nail on its head.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Taunter hit the nail on its head.</p>
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		<title>By: OldGuy</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/11/13/contingent-capital-too-big-to-fail/#comment-33798</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[OldGuy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2009 02:22:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=5497#comment-33798</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Are you sure that Tett&#039;s brain is not hardwired to his pocket book?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Are you sure that Tett&#8217;s brain is not hardwired to his pocket book?</p>
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		<title>By: OldGuy</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/11/13/contingent-capital-too-big-to-fail/#comment-33797</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[OldGuy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2009 02:20:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=5497#comment-33797</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Russ seems to have it pretty much on the money with a nice phrase to boot.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russ seems to have it pretty much on the money with a nice phrase to boot.</p>
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		<title>By: OldGuy</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/11/13/contingent-capital-too-big-to-fail/#comment-33796</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[OldGuy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2009 02:18:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=5497#comment-33796</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Hear, hear!]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hear, hear!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: pebird</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/11/13/contingent-capital-too-big-to-fail/#comment-33791</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[pebird]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2009 21:43:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=5497#comment-33791</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I think the two choices are a little more stark:

1. The nation is the only institution that is too big to fail.

2. The nation has failed.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think the two choices are a little more stark:</p>
<p>1. The nation is the only institution that is too big to fail.</p>
<p>2. The nation has failed.</p>
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		<title>By: csissoko</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/11/13/contingent-capital-too-big-to-fail/#comment-33786</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[csissoko]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2009 18:51:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=5497#comment-33786</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[dk:  &quot;For non bank firms all debt is contingent&quot;

Precisely.  The solution to JK&#039;s concern (&quot;we can&#039;t predict in advance how much capital will be necessary to avert a bank-killing panic&quot;) is to require that all bank debt -- aside from deposits -- is convertible.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>dk:  &#8220;For non bank firms all debt is contingent&#8221;</p>
<p>Precisely.  The solution to JK&#8217;s concern (&#8220;we can&#8217;t predict in advance how much capital will be necessary to avert a bank-killing panic&#8221;) is to require that all bank debt &#8212; aside from deposits &#8212; is convertible.</p>
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		<title>By: Min</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/11/13/contingent-capital-too-big-to-fail/#comment-33783</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Min]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2009 18:34:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=5497#comment-33783</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&quot;First off, when push came to shove the US govt did seize AIG.&quot;

&#039;Scuze me, wasn&#039;t it the other way around?

;)]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;First off, when push came to shove the US govt did seize AIG.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8216;Scuze me, wasn&#8217;t it the other way around?</p>
<p>;)</p>
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		<title>By: Min</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/11/13/contingent-capital-too-big-to-fail/#comment-33780</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Min]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2009 18:25:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=5497#comment-33780</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&quot;Contingent capital, like any other type of capital requirement, assumes that we can predict in advance how bad the crisis will be and therefore how much capital will be necessary to avert a bank-killing panic. That means we have to be able to predict (a) just how fat the fat tail is, based on virtually no data points, and (b) how panicked people can get and for how long. That seems to me technocratic hubris of the first order.&quot;

Not to disagree with you about hubris, but any investment in equity is a guessing game. 

Now, we already have bonds that can be converted to equity -- at the choice of the bondholder. They have markets and prices. People believe, rightly or wrongly, that they can evaluate them. If we have bonds that can be converted to equity at the choice of the issuer, that choice is worth something, and presumably such bonds will have markets and prices, as well. People will believe, rightly or wrongly, that they can evaluate them, too. (After all, markets self-correct in the long run, right? {hehe})

Now, CoCos are not simply convertible at the choice of the issuer, so they should be worth more than bonds that are. There should be markets and prices for them, too. :)

Consider the alternatives. First, if the issuer goes bankrupt, bondholders lose a lot of money, as a rule. They get pennies on the dollar. If their bonds have been converted to equity, they lose everything. OTOH, if the conversion of their bonds manages to save the issuer, they will do better, and may do better than if they held regular bonds and the issuer went bankrupt. Second, if the issuer is bailed out, from the point of view of the society, better that the bondholders do the bailout than the taxpayers, and if the taxpayers do a bailout, better that the bonds are converted to equity.

Yes, the buyers of CoCos may be fools, but better that they take on the risk privately than socializing it. :)]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;Contingent capital, like any other type of capital requirement, assumes that we can predict in advance how bad the crisis will be and therefore how much capital will be necessary to avert a bank-killing panic. That means we have to be able to predict (a) just how fat the fat tail is, based on virtually no data points, and (b) how panicked people can get and for how long. That seems to me technocratic hubris of the first order.&#8221;</p>
<p>Not to disagree with you about hubris, but any investment in equity is a guessing game. </p>
<p>Now, we already have bonds that can be converted to equity &#8212; at the choice of the bondholder. They have markets and prices. People believe, rightly or wrongly, that they can evaluate them. If we have bonds that can be converted to equity at the choice of the issuer, that choice is worth something, and presumably such bonds will have markets and prices, as well. People will believe, rightly or wrongly, that they can evaluate them, too. (After all, markets self-correct in the long run, right? {hehe})</p>
<p>Now, CoCos are not simply convertible at the choice of the issuer, so they should be worth more than bonds that are. There should be markets and prices for them, too. :)</p>
<p>Consider the alternatives. First, if the issuer goes bankrupt, bondholders lose a lot of money, as a rule. They get pennies on the dollar. If their bonds have been converted to equity, they lose everything. OTOH, if the conversion of their bonds manages to save the issuer, they will do better, and may do better than if they held regular bonds and the issuer went bankrupt. Second, if the issuer is bailed out, from the point of view of the society, better that the bondholders do the bailout than the taxpayers, and if the taxpayers do a bailout, better that the bonds are converted to equity.</p>
<p>Yes, the buyers of CoCos may be fools, but better that they take on the risk privately than socializing it. :)</p>
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		<title>By: dk</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/11/13/contingent-capital-too-big-to-fail/#comment-33779</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[dk]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2009 18:24:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=5497#comment-33779</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[For non bank firms all debt is contingent - if the firm declares bankrupty the orginal shareholders are wiped out and the bond holder&#039;s debt is turned into equity.

This does not work in the finanical servers sector because if a firm declares bankrupty it becomes worthless immeadiately because of the nature of how how banks work.

This puts the government is an impossible situation where they either have to bailout bond holders or let systematically important firms fail, taking out the economy with them.

Contingent capital greatly increases the government&#039;s ability to make debt holder pay for some or all the the bailout, and really just makes bank failures equivalent to non-bank failures.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For non bank firms all debt is contingent &#8211; if the firm declares bankrupty the orginal shareholders are wiped out and the bond holder&#8217;s debt is turned into equity.</p>
<p>This does not work in the finanical servers sector because if a firm declares bankrupty it becomes worthless immeadiately because of the nature of how how banks work.</p>
<p>This puts the government is an impossible situation where they either have to bailout bond holders or let systematically important firms fail, taking out the economy with them.</p>
<p>Contingent capital greatly increases the government&#8217;s ability to make debt holder pay for some or all the the bailout, and really just makes bank failures equivalent to non-bank failures.</p>
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		<title>By: anon</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/11/13/contingent-capital-too-big-to-fail/#comment-33777</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[anon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2009 18:21:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=5497#comment-33777</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[just a thought....
TBTF = Too Big To Fail. 

But wouldn&#039;t it be more appropriate to take out the Too and To from the acronym to make it into...

BF = too Big to Fail

...thereby hightlight BIG and FAIL? 

Just a thought...]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>just a thought&#8230;.<br />
TBTF = Too Big To Fail. </p>
<p>But wouldn&#8217;t it be more appropriate to take out the Too and To from the acronym to make it into&#8230;</p>
<p>BF = too Big to Fail</p>
<p>&#8230;thereby hightlight BIG and FAIL? </p>
<p>Just a thought&#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: Eurocitizen</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/11/13/contingent-capital-too-big-to-fail/#comment-33776</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eurocitizen]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2009 18:19:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=5497#comment-33776</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I agree with the idea that breaking the big banks will not solve the TBTF problem as this is a problem with financial instruments. However, it will make it harder for big banks to influence the government.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I agree with the idea that breaking the big banks will not solve the TBTF problem as this is a problem with financial instruments. However, it will make it harder for big banks to influence the government.</p>
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		<title>By: Taunter</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/11/13/contingent-capital-too-big-to-fail/#comment-33774</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Taunter]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2009 18:10:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=5497#comment-33774</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[This may surprise Ms. Tett, but all unsecured corporate debt in the United States is &quot;contingent convertible.&quot;  So long as the debtor has access to Chapter 11, a judge can modify its capital structure by cramming down debtholders.

Anyone holding the bonds of a bank holding company should be aware of this risk.  It is exists now, it existed in September 2008, it existed when Continental Illinois went down.  That the government refused to use an existing system of resolution designed specifically for the contingency of excessive debt should give some clarity on the government&#039;s willingness to do so in the future.

Shareholders in big finance companies were not given billions of federal gifts because the federal government was bound to do so.  They were given the gifts because the federal government chose to do so.  It had plenty of other options.  An alternative to the bailout regime needs to find a way to avoid the government making the choices it made, not to introduce yet another alternative it will not choose.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This may surprise Ms. Tett, but all unsecured corporate debt in the United States is &#8220;contingent convertible.&#8221;  So long as the debtor has access to Chapter 11, a judge can modify its capital structure by cramming down debtholders.</p>
<p>Anyone holding the bonds of a bank holding company should be aware of this risk.  It is exists now, it existed in September 2008, it existed when Continental Illinois went down.  That the government refused to use an existing system of resolution designed specifically for the contingency of excessive debt should give some clarity on the government&#8217;s willingness to do so in the future.</p>
<p>Shareholders in big finance companies were not given billions of federal gifts because the federal government was bound to do so.  They were given the gifts because the federal government chose to do so.  It had plenty of other options.  An alternative to the bailout regime needs to find a way to avoid the government making the choices it made, not to introduce yet another alternative it will not choose.</p>
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		<title>By: realist</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/11/13/contingent-capital-too-big-to-fail/#comment-33773</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[realist]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2009 18:04:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=5497#comment-33773</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I challenge James Kwak and Simon Johnson — the two most relentless advocates of the ridiculous &quot;breaking up the banks&quot; idea — to address the fact that both Continental Illinois ($40 billion in assets) and LTCM ($80 billion in assets) were considered &quot;too big to fail&quot; and were bailed out. Are we going to force the banks to shrink to below $40 billion in assets?

If Continental and LTCM were TBTF, what good would it do to break Goldman up into four separate $250 billion institutions? That &quot;policy proposal&quot; (and I use that phrase loosely) from Simon Johnson is based on the fact that Goldman had around $250 billion in 1998 — but he fails to address the fact that &lt;i&gt;Goldman was TBTF back in 1998 too&lt;/i&gt;! What a joke!

Neither Kwak nor Johnson can or will address these incredibly simple objections to their so-called &quot;proposals,&quot; because they&#039;re not interested in having a real debate on TBTF. They&#039;re just interested in being quoted in the press and having the rest of the blogosphere worship them.

If you&#039;re not willing to offer a concrete proposal, or to address blindingly obvious problems with the &quot;break up the banks&quot; idea, then shut up.

p.s. James — if you can&#039;t think on a &lt;i&gt;much&lt;/i&gt; more granular level than this, then you&#039;re going to have a &lt;i&gt;very&lt;/i&gt; tough time getting a job at a good firm when you graduate. Just FYI.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I challenge James Kwak and Simon Johnson — the two most relentless advocates of the ridiculous &#8220;breaking up the banks&#8221; idea — to address the fact that both Continental Illinois ($40 billion in assets) and LTCM ($80 billion in assets) were considered &#8220;too big to fail&#8221; and were bailed out. Are we going to force the banks to shrink to below $40 billion in assets?</p>
<p>If Continental and LTCM were TBTF, what good would it do to break Goldman up into four separate $250 billion institutions? That &#8220;policy proposal&#8221; (and I use that phrase loosely) from Simon Johnson is based on the fact that Goldman had around $250 billion in 1998 — but he fails to address the fact that <i>Goldman was TBTF back in 1998 too</i>! What a joke!</p>
<p>Neither Kwak nor Johnson can or will address these incredibly simple objections to their so-called &#8220;proposals,&#8221; because they&#8217;re not interested in having a real debate on TBTF. They&#8217;re just interested in being quoted in the press and having the rest of the blogosphere worship them.</p>
<p>If you&#8217;re not willing to offer a concrete proposal, or to address blindingly obvious problems with the &#8220;break up the banks&#8221; idea, then shut up.</p>
<p>p.s. James — if you can&#8217;t think on a <i>much</i> more granular level than this, then you&#8217;re going to have a <i>very</i> tough time getting a job at a good firm when you graduate. Just FYI.</p>
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