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	<title>Comments on: After Peak Finance: Larry Summers&#8217; Bubble</title>
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	<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/07/24/after-peak-finance-larry-summers-bubble/</link>
	<description>What happened to the global economy and what we can do about it</description>
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		<title>By: mike</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/07/24/after-peak-finance-larry-summers-bubble/#comment-23165</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[mike]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 09 Aug 2009 03:15:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4461#comment-23165</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&quot; We must fear the disruption of remaking our infrastructure &quot;

We all love our computers, and the internet.  However, how we&#039;ve used them both, how we&#039;ve allowed younger people who are not seasoned decision-makers to use these tools, and how we&#039;ve allowed seasoned decision-makers to have retired at very young ages ... I think we&#039;ve made huge mistakes.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8221; We must fear the disruption of remaking our infrastructure &#8221;</p>
<p>We all love our computers, and the internet.  However, how we&#8217;ve used them both, how we&#8217;ve allowed younger people who are not seasoned decision-makers to use these tools, and how we&#8217;ve allowed seasoned decision-makers to have retired at very young ages &#8230; I think we&#8217;ve made huge mistakes.</p>
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		<title>By: Peter</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/07/24/after-peak-finance-larry-summers-bubble/#comment-21679</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 Jul 2009 02:16:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4461#comment-21679</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Game Over ?

They have until October.

Politics always trumps Free Markets and it&#039;s all calculated!

If this fiasco hasn&#039;t turned-around by then, the O-Team will send in &quot;The Cleaner&quot; and the Election Cycle will rein.

Result: 
- misallocated Capital encouraged overcapacity and the Social Contract with Labor is null &amp; void
- End of &#039;09, Bargaining &amp; Hope is lost and Anger causes heads to roll (i.e., B.B., L.S. and T.G. are out as the nation moves closer to socialism)
- 2010 will bring Depression and will end with Acceptance 
- 2011 re-election campaign kicks in with promises to Labor of a &quot;Road to Recovery&quot;
- 2012 Capital gets the backseat, Labor is in the driver&#039;s seat. O-Team is re-elected with a majority in the House

The fate of capitalism as we know it, will forever have changed!

Election Cycles:
...note election year Novembers, the February following election year Novembers has been an excellent indicator as to whether the election year November would mark[s] an important top. In every case since at least 1968, when February following election year November moves to a higher high than the January following election year November, the market has proceeded to do very well. 

Conversely, when the post-election year February is unable to move higher than the post-election year January, a significant market decline has always followed. This may be coincidence but it has proved prescient for at least the past 40 years.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Game Over ?</p>
<p>They have until October.</p>
<p>Politics always trumps Free Markets and it&#8217;s all calculated!</p>
<p>If this fiasco hasn&#8217;t turned-around by then, the O-Team will send in &#8220;The Cleaner&#8221; and the Election Cycle will rein.</p>
<p>Result:<br />
- misallocated Capital encouraged overcapacity and the Social Contract with Labor is null &amp; void<br />
- End of &#8217;09, Bargaining &amp; Hope is lost and Anger causes heads to roll (i.e., B.B., L.S. and T.G. are out as the nation moves closer to socialism)<br />
- 2010 will bring Depression and will end with Acceptance<br />
- 2011 re-election campaign kicks in with promises to Labor of a &#8220;Road to Recovery&#8221;<br />
- 2012 Capital gets the backseat, Labor is in the driver&#8217;s seat. O-Team is re-elected with a majority in the House</p>
<p>The fate of capitalism as we know it, will forever have changed!</p>
<p>Election Cycles:<br />
&#8230;note election year Novembers, the February following election year Novembers has been an excellent indicator as to whether the election year November would mark[s] an important top. In every case since at least 1968, when February following election year November moves to a higher high than the January following election year November, the market has proceeded to do very well. </p>
<p>Conversely, when the post-election year February is unable to move higher than the post-election year January, a significant market decline has always followed. This may be coincidence but it has proved prescient for at least the past 40 years.</p>
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		<title>By: Helen Updike</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/07/24/after-peak-finance-larry-summers-bubble/#comment-21383</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Helen Updike]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Jul 2009 17:22:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4461#comment-21383</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The rentier class wallowing in money creates a market awash with cash. Thus, they can only earn unsatisfactory rates of return, while at the same time, the US middle and working classes are being hollowed out. This all came about because the usury laws in borrowers&#039; states were judged by the Supreme Court to be superseded under the National Bank Act (1864?) by the usury laws in the lender&#039;s state. So all the credit card companies are based in no-usury-law states, and borrowers have no protection from lenders&#039; rapacity. Lenders able to charge any interest rate combined with the financial pressure deteriorating incomes put on working Americans and the relentless pressure to consume, consume, consume, plus various generous tax cuts for the very richest, etc., etc., insured that money flowed rapidly to the rentiers. Consumer debt put off the day of reckoning, but now it&#039;s here.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The rentier class wallowing in money creates a market awash with cash. Thus, they can only earn unsatisfactory rates of return, while at the same time, the US middle and working classes are being hollowed out. This all came about because the usury laws in borrowers&#8217; states were judged by the Supreme Court to be superseded under the National Bank Act (1864?) by the usury laws in the lender&#8217;s state. So all the credit card companies are based in no-usury-law states, and borrowers have no protection from lenders&#8217; rapacity. Lenders able to charge any interest rate combined with the financial pressure deteriorating incomes put on working Americans and the relentless pressure to consume, consume, consume, plus various generous tax cuts for the very richest, etc., etc., insured that money flowed rapidly to the rentiers. Consumer debt put off the day of reckoning, but now it&#8217;s here.</p>
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		<title>By: annie simon</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/07/24/after-peak-finance-larry-summers-bubble/#comment-21173</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[annie simon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 26 Jul 2009 16:33:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4461#comment-21173</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Kaleidescope, good post.   I remember when the media was full of reports that the large banks might collapse because third world countries were defaulting on all those mega-loans.  Then very shortly afterward the banks invented RRSPs, and the middle class bought in and began contibuting big chunks of their monthly paychecks into the banks --  and there was no more talk of bank collapse.  Connected?  I&#039;m certainly no expert but hmmm.  And I always figured there was no way people would all be able to benefit from those RRSPs -- there were just too many of them..  

 It seems to me that the whole investment-&amp;-dividend  game can only work for a wealthy minority drawing on the life-energies of the many.  If you get too many on board and not enough floating the boat, it won&#039;t work. It may appear to work for a while but it won&#039;t be grounded,  it will be some kind of bubble.  Soon after the RRSP thing began, the middle classes started playing around in the the stock market, and Wall Street affairs became a common subject of conversation.  I think the large number of people trying to play the dividend game made its collapse inevitable.  

BTW what an excellent string of commentary!  Wow.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Kaleidescope, good post.   I remember when the media was full of reports that the large banks might collapse because third world countries were defaulting on all those mega-loans.  Then very shortly afterward the banks invented RRSPs, and the middle class bought in and began contibuting big chunks of their monthly paychecks into the banks &#8212;  and there was no more talk of bank collapse.  Connected?  I&#8217;m certainly no expert but hmmm.  And I always figured there was no way people would all be able to benefit from those RRSPs &#8212; there were just too many of them..  </p>
<p> It seems to me that the whole investment-&amp;-dividend  game can only work for a wealthy minority drawing on the life-energies of the many.  If you get too many on board and not enough floating the boat, it won&#8217;t work. It may appear to work for a while but it won&#8217;t be grounded,  it will be some kind of bubble.  Soon after the RRSP thing began, the middle classes started playing around in the the stock market, and Wall Street affairs became a common subject of conversation.  I think the large number of people trying to play the dividend game made its collapse inevitable.  </p>
<p>BTW what an excellent string of commentary!  Wow.</p>
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		<title>By: Ze</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/07/24/after-peak-finance-larry-summers-bubble/#comment-21166</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ze]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 26 Jul 2009 15:19:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4461#comment-21166</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Actually, not only can we expect financial firms to have a smaller share of corporate profits in the future, but also that aggregate corporate profits themselves, as a share of GDP, will decrease from their current levels. As nicely explained by Jeremy Grantham (see his articles at http://www.gmo.com), personal income in the US (as a percentage of GDP) has been declining for several decades now, while corporations have been earning an ever larger share of GDP. This process seems to have started a reversal recently (according to a graph in the &quot;National Economic Trends&quot; booklet published by the Saint-Louis Fed) and may potentially exacerbate the earnings decline of financial corporations.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Actually, not only can we expect financial firms to have a smaller share of corporate profits in the future, but also that aggregate corporate profits themselves, as a share of GDP, will decrease from their current levels. As nicely explained by Jeremy Grantham (see his articles at <a href="http://www.gmo.com" rel="nofollow">http://www.gmo.com</a>), personal income in the US (as a percentage of GDP) has been declining for several decades now, while corporations have been earning an ever larger share of GDP. This process seems to have started a reversal recently (according to a graph in the &#8220;National Economic Trends&#8221; booklet published by the Saint-Louis Fed) and may potentially exacerbate the earnings decline of financial corporations.</p>
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		<title>By: Pak</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/07/24/after-peak-finance-larry-summers-bubble/#comment-21163</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Pak]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 26 Jul 2009 14:46:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4461#comment-21163</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I&#039;d rather call it &#039;peak credit&#039; rather than &#039;peak finance&#039;. The latter is merely a socio-economic consequence of the former.

For over 25 years now, Central Bankers across the world have adhered to the view that as long as inflation is not showing up, there&#039;s no problem. And as asset values are not included in any money velocity measures, we have bubbles but no inflation.

And whenever inflation actually starts showing up.. they &#039;adjust&#039; statiscical methods.. and it disappears again!)

How can you &#039;stimulate&#039; economy out of a recession which is so severe EXACTLY because economy has been OVERSTIMULATED with cheap credit for 25 years?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;d rather call it &#8216;peak credit&#8217; rather than &#8216;peak finance&#8217;. The latter is merely a socio-economic consequence of the former.</p>
<p>For over 25 years now, Central Bankers across the world have adhered to the view that as long as inflation is not showing up, there&#8217;s no problem. And as asset values are not included in any money velocity measures, we have bubbles but no inflation.</p>
<p>And whenever inflation actually starts showing up.. they &#8216;adjust&#8217; statiscical methods.. and it disappears again!)</p>
<p>How can you &#8216;stimulate&#8217; economy out of a recession which is so severe EXACTLY because economy has been OVERSTIMULATED with cheap credit for 25 years?</p>
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		<title>By: Nick</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/07/24/after-peak-finance-larry-summers-bubble/#comment-21129</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nick]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 26 Jul 2009 03:39:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4461#comment-21129</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[During the Tulip Mania in the Netherlands people used mostly their own money to bid up prices of tulips.  There wasn&#039;t a lot of debt involved.  And that&#039;s why the consequences of that bubble bursting weren&#039;t disastrous for their economy.

And the stock market tech mania where Nasdaq went up all the way to 5000 was mostly bid up with people&#039;s own money.  Because there was a limit how much margin people were allowed use to buy shares.  The US government legislated this margin limit after the 1929 stock market crash.   

Perhaps some similar borrowing limit needs to be put on all types of loans.  When people loose mostly their own money.  Then it&#039;s mostly their own problem and not a problem for the whole economy.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>During the Tulip Mania in the Netherlands people used mostly their own money to bid up prices of tulips.  There wasn&#8217;t a lot of debt involved.  And that&#8217;s why the consequences of that bubble bursting weren&#8217;t disastrous for their economy.</p>
<p>And the stock market tech mania where Nasdaq went up all the way to 5000 was mostly bid up with people&#8217;s own money.  Because there was a limit how much margin people were allowed use to buy shares.  The US government legislated this margin limit after the 1929 stock market crash.   </p>
<p>Perhaps some similar borrowing limit needs to be put on all types of loans.  When people loose mostly their own money.  Then it&#8217;s mostly their own problem and not a problem for the whole economy.</p>
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		<title>By: Earl Killian</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/07/24/after-peak-finance-larry-summers-bubble/#comment-21109</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Earl Killian]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Jul 2009 23:14:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4461#comment-21109</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[You wrote, &quot;&lt;i&gt;The overall official consensus ... seems to be that our problems are: housing bubble plus bad management in a few big financial firms and slightly too weak regulation.&lt;/i&gt;&quot;

People want to learn only a tiny lesson from a big problem. This is not good. (I was going to say &quot;micro&quot; and &quot;mega&quot; instead of &quot;tiny&quot; and &quot;big&quot;, but I figured &quot;micro&quot; means something else in this blog.)

The problem for regulators is with innovation. They don&#039;t know how to regulate new things; the new things haven&#039;t failed before—they&#039;re too new—so they get a pass. When they fail, the regulators say &quot;we should watch out in the future.&quot; That just drives innovation to unregulated areas.

I conjecture that non-self-aware financial models/algorithms will always fail because they cannot anticipate their own impact upon the market. In this case the models did not anticipate that their own use would drive the system outside of the limited historical data used to assess risk. (I.e. I&#039;m saying that the use of mortgage securitization led to subprime lending to keep the pipeline flowing, i.e. it created its own ruin.)

If regulators and investors are ever going to anticipate the next problem, they need to predict the effects of innovation upon the market before it fails. That&#039;s a very tall order. Especially considering that predictions usually say more about the seer than the future.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You wrote, &#8220;<i>The overall official consensus &#8230; seems to be that our problems are: housing bubble plus bad management in a few big financial firms and slightly too weak regulation.</i>&#8221;</p>
<p>People want to learn only a tiny lesson from a big problem. This is not good. (I was going to say &#8220;micro&#8221; and &#8220;mega&#8221; instead of &#8220;tiny&#8221; and &#8220;big&#8221;, but I figured &#8220;micro&#8221; means something else in this blog.)</p>
<p>The problem for regulators is with innovation. They don&#8217;t know how to regulate new things; the new things haven&#8217;t failed before—they&#8217;re too new—so they get a pass. When they fail, the regulators say &#8220;we should watch out in the future.&#8221; That just drives innovation to unregulated areas.</p>
<p>I conjecture that non-self-aware financial models/algorithms will always fail because they cannot anticipate their own impact upon the market. In this case the models did not anticipate that their own use would drive the system outside of the limited historical data used to assess risk. (I.e. I&#8217;m saying that the use of mortgage securitization led to subprime lending to keep the pipeline flowing, i.e. it created its own ruin.)</p>
<p>If regulators and investors are ever going to anticipate the next problem, they need to predict the effects of innovation upon the market before it fails. That&#8217;s a very tall order. Especially considering that predictions usually say more about the seer than the future.</p>
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		<title>By: Roger Maris</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/07/24/after-peak-finance-larry-summers-bubble/#comment-21085</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Roger Maris]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Jul 2009 20:22:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4461#comment-21085</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[What are you talking about?  People don&#039;t bid up prices to unsustainable levels when their own money is involved.  Need proof?  Every single financial bubble in history was based on leverage or OPM.  The higher the degree of OPM involved, the bigger the bubble.  That&#039;s all you need to know.

If you want to argue the point, let me give you an example.  I am a prudent person.  I wouldn&#039;t think of buying real estate without 20% down.  Why?  Because I want to protect my downside.  I don&#039;t want to walk away.  That&#039;s why I live on the Great Plains and not in California.  I knew prices were ridiculous there.  As a prudent person using my own money, I had no desire to overpay.  I cared about price.  Now imagine if I had to pay 100% cash?  Would I be more or less prudent?   That&#039;s why it is only debt which makes such behavior possible.

Your comment about regulators indicates a complete lack of understanding.  Regulators want bubbles because everything they do encourages the sort of reckless behavior that leads to them.  If I say I care about my health but I sit around and eat bacon all day, I don&#039;t care about my health.  What I say isn&#039;t important.  What I do says it all.  Lending is profitable.  Bankers run the government.  Regulators work for the government and the government works for the bankers.

Regulators?

Too funny for words!]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What are you talking about?  People don&#8217;t bid up prices to unsustainable levels when their own money is involved.  Need proof?  Every single financial bubble in history was based on leverage or OPM.  The higher the degree of OPM involved, the bigger the bubble.  That&#8217;s all you need to know.</p>
<p>If you want to argue the point, let me give you an example.  I am a prudent person.  I wouldn&#8217;t think of buying real estate without 20% down.  Why?  Because I want to protect my downside.  I don&#8217;t want to walk away.  That&#8217;s why I live on the Great Plains and not in California.  I knew prices were ridiculous there.  As a prudent person using my own money, I had no desire to overpay.  I cared about price.  Now imagine if I had to pay 100% cash?  Would I be more or less prudent?   That&#8217;s why it is only debt which makes such behavior possible.</p>
<p>Your comment about regulators indicates a complete lack of understanding.  Regulators want bubbles because everything they do encourages the sort of reckless behavior that leads to them.  If I say I care about my health but I sit around and eat bacon all day, I don&#8217;t care about my health.  What I say isn&#8217;t important.  What I do says it all.  Lending is profitable.  Bankers run the government.  Regulators work for the government and the government works for the bankers.</p>
<p>Regulators?</p>
<p>Too funny for words!</p>
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		<title>By: Roger Maris</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/07/24/after-peak-finance-larry-summers-bubble/#comment-21083</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Roger Maris]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Jul 2009 20:10:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4461#comment-21083</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[It can&#039;t be, it isn&#039;t and it never was.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It can&#8217;t be, it isn&#8217;t and it never was.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Roger Maris</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/07/24/after-peak-finance-larry-summers-bubble/#comment-21082</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Roger Maris]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Jul 2009 20:09:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4461#comment-21082</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[This column was bizarre.  What we are facing is nothing more than a good old fashioned credit bubble.  There is nothing new about this, except for the size of the thing. Connect the dots:

1.  The consumer spent instead of saved.
2.  The consumer pulled equity from the one asset he had...a personal residence....and spent.
3.  Financial and industrial firms failed to properly forecast the % of total spending that was pulled forward through debt.
4.  These same firms overexpanded on the basis of unrealistic and unsustainable growth forecasts.

Once the consumer stopped spending, it all fell apart rather quickly AS IT ALWAYS DOES.  You might want to check your history on the Dutch Tulip Bulb Crisis as well. Start with Kindleberger.  Tulip bulbs seem bizarre to us but when you think about what people were paying for a share of, oh say Pets.com for example, it doesn&#039;t look so bizarre any more.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This column was bizarre.  What we are facing is nothing more than a good old fashioned credit bubble.  There is nothing new about this, except for the size of the thing. Connect the dots:</p>
<p>1.  The consumer spent instead of saved.<br />
2.  The consumer pulled equity from the one asset he had&#8230;a personal residence&#8230;.and spent.<br />
3.  Financial and industrial firms failed to properly forecast the % of total spending that was pulled forward through debt.<br />
4.  These same firms overexpanded on the basis of unrealistic and unsustainable growth forecasts.</p>
<p>Once the consumer stopped spending, it all fell apart rather quickly AS IT ALWAYS DOES.  You might want to check your history on the Dutch Tulip Bulb Crisis as well. Start with Kindleberger.  Tulip bulbs seem bizarre to us but when you think about what people were paying for a share of, oh say Pets.com for example, it doesn&#8217;t look so bizarre any more.</p>
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		<title>By: Eric W</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/07/24/after-peak-finance-larry-summers-bubble/#comment-21073</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric W]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Jul 2009 16:47:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4461#comment-21073</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[kaleidescope: I&#039;d like to add another factor to your &quot;that the normal safe return on capital is simply not acceptable&quot;, and that is that the amount of money handled and managed by the banks has grown so large that not only are there &quot;too many assets chasing too little market share&quot; but there was simply no place for the money to go without the invention of whole new classes of storage space (investments) for that money. Derivatives, CDSs, CDOs, all kinds of financial innovations, are not just attempts to get a higher return, but necessities for the banks as repositories for their money. There simply aren&#039;t enough opportunities to invest in companies &quot;that makes things people want&quot; for the amount of money available. There weren&#039;t enough homes being bought the old fashioned way to absorb the bankers&#039; money. Add to that the fact that the new financial innovations were much easier money (think scam and fraud here), and it is no wonder that these fads exist and will continue. 

The mathematics imply that the long-term result of our financial system is for the financial sector to eventually own all the money, and all the goods and assets (through foreclosure and repossession). In the meantime, the financial sector becomes more and more desperate to find piggy banks in which to put their money. They think they are simply looking for returns, but on a more basic level it is a search for storage space. Such a system, over a very long time horizon, must be unstable. I hope so, because otherwise it means permanent enslavement for any who thought they might have had &quot;certain unalienable Rights&quot;...]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>kaleidescope: I&#8217;d like to add another factor to your &#8220;that the normal safe return on capital is simply not acceptable&#8221;, and that is that the amount of money handled and managed by the banks has grown so large that not only are there &#8220;too many assets chasing too little market share&#8221; but there was simply no place for the money to go without the invention of whole new classes of storage space (investments) for that money. Derivatives, CDSs, CDOs, all kinds of financial innovations, are not just attempts to get a higher return, but necessities for the banks as repositories for their money. There simply aren&#8217;t enough opportunities to invest in companies &#8220;that makes things people want&#8221; for the amount of money available. There weren&#8217;t enough homes being bought the old fashioned way to absorb the bankers&#8217; money. Add to that the fact that the new financial innovations were much easier money (think scam and fraud here), and it is no wonder that these fads exist and will continue. </p>
<p>The mathematics imply that the long-term result of our financial system is for the financial sector to eventually own all the money, and all the goods and assets (through foreclosure and repossession). In the meantime, the financial sector becomes more and more desperate to find piggy banks in which to put their money. They think they are simply looking for returns, but on a more basic level it is a search for storage space. Such a system, over a very long time horizon, must be unstable. I hope so, because otherwise it means permanent enslavement for any who thought they might have had &#8220;certain unalienable Rights&#8221;&#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: Tippy Golden</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/07/24/after-peak-finance-larry-summers-bubble/#comment-21069</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tippy Golden]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Jul 2009 16:02:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4461#comment-21069</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Dave, the links are very helpful. --- Tx]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Dave, the links are very helpful. &#8212; Tx</p>
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		<title>By: kaleidescope</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/07/24/after-peak-finance-larry-summers-bubble/#comment-21066</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[kaleidescope]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Jul 2009 15:12:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4461#comment-21066</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Back in the dark ages of my post-graduate pre-law school years, I took a graduate level class at UW-Madison on governance of the economy.  I wrote my paper on the collapse of the Franklin National Bank and its connection to the Latin American loan crisis of the early 1980&#039;s.  This was a whole different crisis from the later Savings and Loan crisis.

It was clear at that time -- 1984 -- that a great fad had run through the banking sector, lending (what at that time seemed) huge sums to Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, etc.  My paper concerned the possible role that the IMF could play as an international version of the FDIC -- coordinating creditors so as to be able to keep the international debtors sufficiently alive so that the maximum amount feasible could be paid back.

But these fads -- Latin American lending, Savings and Loan go-go days, junk bond takeovers, brokering Japanese investment in U.S. assets, dot-com/tele-com, housing, securitization -- are all serial bubbles.  And they all seem to me to stem from a common complaint amongst our rentier class -- that the normal safe return on capital is simply not acceptable.  That the money to be made by investing in a company that makes things people want is so pre-1973.

It seems like there are too many assets chasing too little market share and that our financial system has been chasing its tail -- and swallowing it regularly -- since, oh, about 1973.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Back in the dark ages of my post-graduate pre-law school years, I took a graduate level class at UW-Madison on governance of the economy.  I wrote my paper on the collapse of the Franklin National Bank and its connection to the Latin American loan crisis of the early 1980&#8242;s.  This was a whole different crisis from the later Savings and Loan crisis.</p>
<p>It was clear at that time &#8212; 1984 &#8212; that a great fad had run through the banking sector, lending (what at that time seemed) huge sums to Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, etc.  My paper concerned the possible role that the IMF could play as an international version of the FDIC &#8212; coordinating creditors so as to be able to keep the international debtors sufficiently alive so that the maximum amount feasible could be paid back.</p>
<p>But these fads &#8212; Latin American lending, Savings and Loan go-go days, junk bond takeovers, brokering Japanese investment in U.S. assets, dot-com/tele-com, housing, securitization &#8212; are all serial bubbles.  And they all seem to me to stem from a common complaint amongst our rentier class &#8212; that the normal safe return on capital is simply not acceptable.  That the money to be made by investing in a company that makes things people want is so pre-1973.</p>
<p>It seems like there are too many assets chasing too little market share and that our financial system has been chasing its tail &#8212; and swallowing it regularly &#8212; since, oh, about 1973.</p>
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		<title>By: Joseph Doniach</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/07/24/after-peak-finance-larry-summers-bubble/#comment-21062</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joseph Doniach]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Jul 2009 14:38:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4461#comment-21062</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Simon, you and Paul Krugman and others have written about Geithner, Bernanke and Summers&#039; failure to, in Krugman&#039;s words &quot;make banking boring again&quot; by pressing for similar banking regulations to those enacted under FDR. Is a possible that a reason for their seeming lack of interest is because they think the passage of such regulations in the thirties acted as a damper on the recovery from the Great Depression?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Simon, you and Paul Krugman and others have written about Geithner, Bernanke and Summers&#8217; failure to, in Krugman&#8217;s words &#8220;make banking boring again&#8221; by pressing for similar banking regulations to those enacted under FDR. Is a possible that a reason for their seeming lack of interest is because they think the passage of such regulations in the thirties acted as a damper on the recovery from the Great Depression?</p>
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