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	<title>Comments on: Conventional Wisdom About Credit Default Swaps</title>
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		<title>By: Twotenths</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/06/25/conventional-wisdom-about-credit-default-swaps/#comment-19898</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Twotenths]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2009 15:04:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4140#comment-19898</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Check this out:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124718445317920379.html
Big Companies Go to Washington to Fight Regulations on Fancy Derivatives

This article illustrates very clearly something that has been missing from a lot of commentary here: These products which serve no valid puropse, according to critics, have a lot of customers.  Probably not all of whom are foolish.  Maybe someone could ask these firms why they are so willing to be ripped off by overly complex instruments that provide poor value?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Check this out:<br />
<a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124718445317920379.html" rel="nofollow">http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124718445317920379.html</a><br />
Big Companies Go to Washington to Fight Regulations on Fancy Derivatives</p>
<p>This article illustrates very clearly something that has been missing from a lot of commentary here: These products which serve no valid puropse, according to critics, have a lot of customers.  Probably not all of whom are foolish.  Maybe someone could ask these firms why they are so willing to be ripped off by overly complex instruments that provide poor value?</p>
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		<title>By: Conventional Wisdom About Credit Default Swaps « The Baseline Scenario &#124; Crédit en Ligne</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/06/25/conventional-wisdom-about-credit-default-swaps/#comment-19741</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Conventional Wisdom About Credit Default Swaps « The Baseline Scenario &#124; Crédit en Ligne]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 11 Jul 2009 17:21:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4140#comment-19741</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] de Info: Conventional Wisdom About Credit Default Swaps « The Baseline Scenario   Share and [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] de Info: Conventional Wisdom About Credit Default Swaps « The Baseline Scenario   Share and [...]</p>
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		<title>By: The Baseline Scenario &#124; EthicalMarkets.com</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/06/25/conventional-wisdom-about-credit-default-swaps/#comment-18851</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[The Baseline Scenario &#124; EthicalMarkets.com]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2009 13:40:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4140#comment-18851</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] Conventional Wisdom About Credit Default Swaps Posted: 25 Jun 2009 10:00 AM PDT [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Conventional Wisdom About Credit Default Swaps Posted: 25 Jun 2009 10:00 AM PDT [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Dirk van Dijk</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/06/25/conventional-wisdom-about-credit-default-swaps/#comment-18799</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Dirk van Dijk]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 28 Jun 2009 23:04:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4140#comment-18799</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Ok this is probably a dead thread, but the best way to think about CDS&#039;s is that they are life insurance policies but on companies instead of individuals.  In life insurance you have to have an insurable interest to take out a policy.  In other words you can insure yourself, your spouse, maybe a business partner, but that is about it.  You cant wander the halls of the nursing home and decide, old Mrs. Murphy doesnt look so hot, I&#039;ll take out a policy on her.  And if you are a cardiac surgon, you are not allowed to take out a policy on the guy about to go under your knife.  Require an absolute insuable interest before a CDS can be written and allow no more than that amount to be insured.  In other words, to have a CDS on a company you have to own the bond.  If you sell the bond, the CDS policy becomes null and void.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ok this is probably a dead thread, but the best way to think about CDS&#8217;s is that they are life insurance policies but on companies instead of individuals.  In life insurance you have to have an insurable interest to take out a policy.  In other words you can insure yourself, your spouse, maybe a business partner, but that is about it.  You cant wander the halls of the nursing home and decide, old Mrs. Murphy doesnt look so hot, I&#8217;ll take out a policy on her.  And if you are a cardiac surgon, you are not allowed to take out a policy on the guy about to go under your knife.  Require an absolute insuable interest before a CDS can be written and allow no more than that amount to be insured.  In other words, to have a CDS on a company you have to own the bond.  If you sell the bond, the CDS policy becomes null and void.</p>
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		<title>By: Bill N</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/06/25/conventional-wisdom-about-credit-default-swaps/#comment-18768</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bill N]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 28 Jun 2009 00:03:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4140#comment-18768</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Whoops, too many responses.  Anyway - The issue to me is that you don&#039;t need to solve the CDS problem for all time.  Regulate per the O team.  For customized derivatives, report &#039;em as provided.  The reportee adds up the notional values.  If at some point the total gets to, say, 1X GDP  (or, 2X?), then, bang, the SEC is now regulating them, and makes a few general statements such as capital requirements and etc.  Anyone found to be in violation, ever, goes to the slammer.

I call it the Duck Law* - if it looks like a security and behaves substantially like a security, then it is de jure a security.

/b
*http://vituscapital.blogspot.com/2008/10/venal-bastards-on-wall-street.html]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Whoops, too many responses.  Anyway &#8211; The issue to me is that you don&#8217;t need to solve the CDS problem for all time.  Regulate per the O team.  For customized derivatives, report &#8216;em as provided.  The reportee adds up the notional values.  If at some point the total gets to, say, 1X GDP  (or, 2X?), then, bang, the SEC is now regulating them, and makes a few general statements such as capital requirements and etc.  Anyone found to be in violation, ever, goes to the slammer.</p>
<p>I call it the Duck Law* &#8211; if it looks like a security and behaves substantially like a security, then it is de jure a security.</p>
<p>/b<br />
*<a href="http://vituscapital.blogspot.com/2008/10/venal-bastards-on-wall-street.html" rel="nofollow">http://vituscapital.blogspot.com/2008/10/venal-bastards-on-wall-street.html</a></p>
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		<title>By: Benedict@Large</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/06/25/conventional-wisdom-about-credit-default-swaps/#comment-18735</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Benedict@Large]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 27 Jun 2009 13:57:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4140#comment-18735</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[If a CDS cannot be written in a form that allows for exchange trading, it is almost certain that its basis is unpricable without prohititive costs to do so (if even then). As such, any attempt at price discovery  is nothing more than a wild guess, regardless of what sort of sophisticated model you can pay a quant to apply. Another word for this kind of guessing is gambling.

Much is made of how the financial industry has soared in size relative to the rest of the economy, but this fact is not often equated to the massive increase in derivatives transaction fees and most especially CDS fees. When these two facts are looked at in concunction, it becomes clear that what we&#039;ve done is allow casino economics to overwhelm our banking system. While this may be nice for the croupieres with their multimillion dollar annual bonuses, it&#039;s effects on the rest of us have now become excrutiatingly obvious.

Whatever limited benefits the supporters of these transactions might claim they have, the externalities created by them have become a huge unfair tax on the rest of us; a tax yielding insufficient (if any)  benefit, and a tax unapproved in advance by our legislatures. (Taxation without representation, if you will.) As such, they must be banned from our financial system and from any participating institutions in it. If people still want to enter into these contracts, fine, but they must do so with the crystal clear understanding that there will be no government oversight and NO GOVERNMENT AID in the event of couterparty default.

[For more on this, see Chris Whalen&#039;s prepared statement to the Senate Banking Committee, June 22, 2009: http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/06/over-the-counter-derivatives-modernizing-oversight-to-increase-transparency-and-reduce-risks/ ]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If a CDS cannot be written in a form that allows for exchange trading, it is almost certain that its basis is unpricable without prohititive costs to do so (if even then). As such, any attempt at price discovery  is nothing more than a wild guess, regardless of what sort of sophisticated model you can pay a quant to apply. Another word for this kind of guessing is gambling.</p>
<p>Much is made of how the financial industry has soared in size relative to the rest of the economy, but this fact is not often equated to the massive increase in derivatives transaction fees and most especially CDS fees. When these two facts are looked at in concunction, it becomes clear that what we&#8217;ve done is allow casino economics to overwhelm our banking system. While this may be nice for the croupieres with their multimillion dollar annual bonuses, it&#8217;s effects on the rest of us have now become excrutiatingly obvious.</p>
<p>Whatever limited benefits the supporters of these transactions might claim they have, the externalities created by them have become a huge unfair tax on the rest of us; a tax yielding insufficient (if any)  benefit, and a tax unapproved in advance by our legislatures. (Taxation without representation, if you will.) As such, they must be banned from our financial system and from any participating institutions in it. If people still want to enter into these contracts, fine, but they must do so with the crystal clear understanding that there will be no government oversight and NO GOVERNMENT AID in the event of couterparty default.</p>
<p>[For more on this, see Chris Whalen's prepared statement to the Senate Banking Committee, June 22, 2009: <a href="http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/06/over-the-counter-derivatives-modernizing-oversight-to-increase-transparency-and-reduce-risks/" rel="nofollow">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/06/over-the-counter-derivatives-modernizing-oversight-to-increase-transparency-and-reduce-risks/</a> ]</p>
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		<title>By: Shivz</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/06/25/conventional-wisdom-about-credit-default-swaps/#comment-18724</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Shivz]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 27 Jun 2009 08:12:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4140#comment-18724</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[You are absolutely right. Commercial risks are uninsurable. Period.
Ask yourself whether you could, as a business owner, insure your profits, or losses (on pure commercial gounds). I you think you can, ask then any conventional insurer whether he would cover you. If he did, he would be sitting now in jail.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You are absolutely right. Commercial risks are uninsurable. Period.<br />
Ask yourself whether you could, as a business owner, insure your profits, or losses (on pure commercial gounds). I you think you can, ask then any conventional insurer whether he would cover you. If he did, he would be sitting now in jail.</p>
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		<title>By: Eric W</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/06/25/conventional-wisdom-about-credit-default-swaps/#comment-18702</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric W]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 27 Jun 2009 03:57:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4140#comment-18702</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I don&#039;t think it is only &quot;for the simple purpose of increasing leverage&quot;, I think there&#039;s an even more basic driving force underlying financial innovations. The banks have so much money they need to invent places to put it. I&#039;m serious here. Think of the amount of money in play, and then think of where else it could be legally invested without overwhelming that investment vehicle. It also explains the incredible rise in banking compensation over the last 10 years--they have too much money to find investments for, so they get rid of it.

So I agree with you that it is a &quot;gambling casino&quot;, but it is also a holding pen for money.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I don&#8217;t think it is only &#8220;for the simple purpose of increasing leverage&#8221;, I think there&#8217;s an even more basic driving force underlying financial innovations. The banks have so much money they need to invent places to put it. I&#8217;m serious here. Think of the amount of money in play, and then think of where else it could be legally invested without overwhelming that investment vehicle. It also explains the incredible rise in banking compensation over the last 10 years&#8211;they have too much money to find investments for, so they get rid of it.</p>
<p>So I agree with you that it is a &#8220;gambling casino&#8221;, but it is also a holding pen for money.</p>
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		<title>By: sophie major</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/06/25/conventional-wisdom-about-credit-default-swaps/#comment-18679</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[sophie major]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 27 Jun 2009 00:06:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4140#comment-18679</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Bravo Min!

The thugs make their bets with the bookie AIG, then paulson says, don&#039;t worry, the US Taxpayers will pay the bill because winning that massive value is the only way the world wont end as we know it--how bout good old fashion bankruptcy, unemployment, suffering---instead, the whole US is at risk for this massive devaluation of our currency.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bravo Min!</p>
<p>The thugs make their bets with the bookie AIG, then paulson says, don&#8217;t worry, the US Taxpayers will pay the bill because winning that massive value is the only way the world wont end as we know it&#8211;how bout good old fashion bankruptcy, unemployment, suffering&#8212;instead, the whole US is at risk for this massive devaluation of our currency.</p>
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		<title>By: Michael Donner</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/06/25/conventional-wisdom-about-credit-default-swaps/#comment-18678</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Donner]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2009 23:27:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4140#comment-18678</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[two obvious things that should be done immediately:  1.  no CDSs unless you have an active, real interest in the underlying issue   2.  no trading of CDSs.

these two simple changes, that could be done immediately would increase our/my financial security right away.
 Michael]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>two obvious things that should be done immediately:  1.  no CDSs unless you have an active, real interest in the underlying issue   2.  no trading of CDSs.</p>
<p>these two simple changes, that could be done immediately would increase our/my financial security right away.<br />
 Michael</p>
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		<title>By: Charles B</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/06/25/conventional-wisdom-about-credit-default-swaps/#comment-18665</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Charles B]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2009 19:54:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4140#comment-18665</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The fundamental point, which James points out, is that risk can&#039;t be eliminated unless return is eliminated, too.  It may be (logically) possible within current market theory to hedge perfectly, but, the cost of hedging perfectly would eliminate all returns.  Market participants can accept this principal while believing that different participants will evaluate a given risk in a specific situation differently or that some information asymmetry will give one party the ability to take advantage of the other party, i. e., that the market isn&#039;t efficient.  Some fool will sell you $1M of life insurance two weeks before you die of cancer for $100,000 (trusting the conclusions of examinations by Dr. Standard or Dr. Poor that you don&#039;t have cancer, say).  Thus, AIG sold $13B worth of risk insurance to Goldman Sachs for some price (which I don&#039;t know).

Twotenths&#039; last comment in his first post is key.  The seller of insurance must add value to the transaction by some ability to mitigate the buyer&#039;s risk better than the buyer (Twotenth&#039;s client).  He has not explained in any satisfactory way, nor has any other participant in this market, how the party who assumes the risks in my contract can mitigate them better or more cheaply than I.  I take the collapse of this market to be overwhelming evidence that no such explanation exists because this abiity is illusory.  This game is essentially a game of Old Maid with several Old Maid cards.  When it stopped, Bear, Lehman and AIG (among others) were left holding the Old Maid.

chas asks good questions - how is this game productive for anyone but the dealers?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The fundamental point, which James points out, is that risk can&#8217;t be eliminated unless return is eliminated, too.  It may be (logically) possible within current market theory to hedge perfectly, but, the cost of hedging perfectly would eliminate all returns.  Market participants can accept this principal while believing that different participants will evaluate a given risk in a specific situation differently or that some information asymmetry will give one party the ability to take advantage of the other party, i. e., that the market isn&#8217;t efficient.  Some fool will sell you $1M of life insurance two weeks before you die of cancer for $100,000 (trusting the conclusions of examinations by Dr. Standard or Dr. Poor that you don&#8217;t have cancer, say).  Thus, AIG sold $13B worth of risk insurance to Goldman Sachs for some price (which I don&#8217;t know).</p>
<p>Twotenths&#8217; last comment in his first post is key.  The seller of insurance must add value to the transaction by some ability to mitigate the buyer&#8217;s risk better than the buyer (Twotenth&#8217;s client).  He has not explained in any satisfactory way, nor has any other participant in this market, how the party who assumes the risks in my contract can mitigate them better or more cheaply than I.  I take the collapse of this market to be overwhelming evidence that no such explanation exists because this abiity is illusory.  This game is essentially a game of Old Maid with several Old Maid cards.  When it stopped, Bear, Lehman and AIG (among others) were left holding the Old Maid.</p>
<p>chas asks good questions &#8211; how is this game productive for anyone but the dealers?</p>
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		<title>By: c. murphy</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/06/25/conventional-wisdom-about-credit-default-swaps/#comment-18654</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[c. murphy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2009 17:15:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4140#comment-18654</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[There is no Constitutional difficulty w these proposed regulations because there is no Constitutional guarantee of &quot;freedom of contract&quot; and  Art.I , Sec. 10, clause 1 regarding &quot;impairment of contracts&quot; applies to State governments not the Federal gov.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There is no Constitutional difficulty w these proposed regulations because there is no Constitutional guarantee of &#8220;freedom of contract&#8221; and  Art.I , Sec. 10, clause 1 regarding &#8220;impairment of contracts&#8221; applies to State governments not the Federal gov.</p>
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		<title>By: Min</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/06/25/conventional-wisdom-about-credit-default-swaps/#comment-18650</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Min]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2009 16:32:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4140#comment-18650</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Twotenths:&quot;It is extremely doubtful that those clients begrudge AIG whatever fees it may have earned on the deals.&quot;

Especially since Paulson funneled taxpayer money through AIG to pay them off.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Twotenths:&#8221;It is extremely doubtful that those clients begrudge AIG whatever fees it may have earned on the deals.&#8221;</p>
<p>Especially since Paulson funneled taxpayer money through AIG to pay them off.</p>
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		<title>By: Paul</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/06/25/conventional-wisdom-about-credit-default-swaps/#comment-18645</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2009 14:47:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4140#comment-18645</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Mbuna- this is not really a reply- I&#039;m just piling on from your comment. 

This is from Chris Whalen posted at Market Ticker:

In my view, CDS contracts and complex structured assets are deceptive by design and beg the question as to whether a certain level of complexity is so speculative and reckless as to violate US securities and anti-fraud laws. That is, if an OTC derivative contract lacks a clear cash basis and cannot be valued by both parties to the transaction with the same degree of facility and transparency as cash market instruments, then the OTC contact should be treated as fraudulent and banned as a matter of law and regulation. Most CDS contracts and complex structured financial instruments fall into this category of deliberately fraudulent instruments for which no cash basis exists.

The clear version of the above, in English.

To put this in &quot;Joe Six Pack&quot; speak this &quot;market&quot; is exactly like playing Blackjack against a dealer who has a supply of aces and kings under the table, and uses them to deal blackjacks to himself any time he would like.

Would you knowingly sit at such a table?

It is my view and that of many other observers that the CDS market is a type of tax or lottery that actually creates net risk and is thus a drain on the resources of the economic system. Simply stated, CDS and CDO markets currently are parasitic. These market subtract value from the global markets and society by increasing risk and then shifting that bigger risk to the least savvy market participants.

And let&#039;s not forget who gets all the money.  JP Morgan, Goldman, et.al.

Seen in this context, AIG was the most visible &quot;sucker&quot; identified by Wall Street, an easy mark that was systematically targeted and drained of capital by JPM, GS and other CDS dealers, in a striking example of predatory behavior. Treasury Secretary Geithner, acting in his previous role of President of the FRBNY, concealed the rape of AIG by the major OTC dealers with a bailout totaling into the hundreds of billions in public funds.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mbuna- this is not really a reply- I&#8217;m just piling on from your comment. </p>
<p>This is from Chris Whalen posted at Market Ticker:</p>
<p>In my view, CDS contracts and complex structured assets are deceptive by design and beg the question as to whether a certain level of complexity is so speculative and reckless as to violate US securities and anti-fraud laws. That is, if an OTC derivative contract lacks a clear cash basis and cannot be valued by both parties to the transaction with the same degree of facility and transparency as cash market instruments, then the OTC contact should be treated as fraudulent and banned as a matter of law and regulation. Most CDS contracts and complex structured financial instruments fall into this category of deliberately fraudulent instruments for which no cash basis exists.</p>
<p>The clear version of the above, in English.</p>
<p>To put this in &#8220;Joe Six Pack&#8221; speak this &#8220;market&#8221; is exactly like playing Blackjack against a dealer who has a supply of aces and kings under the table, and uses them to deal blackjacks to himself any time he would like.</p>
<p>Would you knowingly sit at such a table?</p>
<p>It is my view and that of many other observers that the CDS market is a type of tax or lottery that actually creates net risk and is thus a drain on the resources of the economic system. Simply stated, CDS and CDO markets currently are parasitic. These market subtract value from the global markets and society by increasing risk and then shifting that bigger risk to the least savvy market participants.</p>
<p>And let&#8217;s not forget who gets all the money.  JP Morgan, Goldman, et.al.</p>
<p>Seen in this context, AIG was the most visible &#8220;sucker&#8221; identified by Wall Street, an easy mark that was systematically targeted and drained of capital by JPM, GS and other CDS dealers, in a striking example of predatory behavior. Treasury Secretary Geithner, acting in his previous role of President of the FRBNY, concealed the rape of AIG by the major OTC dealers with a bailout totaling into the hundreds of billions in public funds.</p>
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		<title>By: Links: 2009-06-26 - Credit Writedowns</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/06/25/conventional-wisdom-about-credit-default-swaps/#comment-18640</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Links: 2009-06-26 - Credit Writedowns]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2009 14:13:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=4140#comment-18640</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] Real excerpts of emails from Fed employees as the crisis unfolded. Interesting suffConventional Wisdom About Credit Default Swaps &#8211; James Kwak [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Real excerpts of emails from Fed employees as the crisis unfolded. Interesting suffConventional Wisdom About Credit Default Swaps &#8211; James Kwak [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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