Thanks again. :)

BTW, I usually use a different search engine, which did not have this URL in the first pages.

The answer is in the #2 result in the google search:

http://www.slate.com/id/2060047

I would point out that, according to polls, somewhere between 62% and 75% of both patients and physicians favor a single payer universal health plan, but it is hard to find it being seriously discussed anywhere on Capital Hill or in the popular media. The effect there, and in the financial markets is so patently obvious, and the “soft” disinformation programs are so strong, that you just can’t miss the effect.

No one will ever convince me that these contributions are made on the basis the the contributor strongly feels that the receiving party is incredibly well disposed to govern with superior general effectiveness.

All the more reasons to have publicly financed political campaigns!!!!

The beauty of the blog is you can post something unpolished but interesting for wider consumption. This could be theory, data or a simple model. Other can consume, discuss and expand on those ideas. Sometimes it is best to leave perfected papers for the AER. A second year grad student can tear almost any model to shreds, it takes a few more years to appreciate the insights of a simple model despite its limitation.

Thanks for the URL. Now could you please explain what DW-NOMINATE scores mean? Many thanks. :)

Having said that, I am rarely accused of being funny or entertaining. So, er, thanks.

But Nate’s model is plainly bad. It is almost certainly massively overestimating the impact of PAC contributions. And it implies that eliminating PAC contributions would by itself massively swing senate votes in favor of a public option. (Seriously, a 60% projected swing for Baucus?)

On the other hand, the Ansolabehere et. al. paper has some issues. At a “crude” level, the notion that campaign contributions are a consumption good does not stand well against the (so far journalistic) data suggesting a sharp increase in lobbying expenses resulting from the Stimulus Package.

http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2009/06/09/dc_sees_sharp_spike_in_lobbying_costs_by_mass_firms/

I also take issue with Ansolabehere et. al.’s argument that just because most political donations come from individuals indicates that those donations are a consumption good (e.g. an expression of ideology, rather than something intended to have an effect). That effect might be ALTRUISTIC, in that I do not anticipate capturing the benefits of my donation, but most donors surely intend those donations to have an impact on likelihood of a candidate to win.

The Public Choice doctrine has a very narrow understanding of individual utility (it’s entirely economic), and thus gives a lot of weight to issues such as collective action. Public Choice theory, of course, has a really hard time explaining how Obama managed to pull in >300 million dollars from small/medium donors, many of whom (especially wealthier educated folks) stand to pay a higher share of taxes.

http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm

Following campaign contributions is a pretty good “tell” on where K Street’s going too.

This entire discussion about whether or not K Street matters is kind of funny. Maybe I should be more diplomatic. Not funny, entertaining.

When the vote’s going to be close moving one vote matters a great deal. And the “lobbying” money being spent might just be a nice job for a nephew.

People arguing that all this lucre sloshing around D.C. has little effect are funny. Ooops. Entertaining.

But I would like to add that there are papers that assess roll call votes and come up with positive results on campaign contributions, e.g. Brooks, Cameron, and Carter (1998), Gordon (2001), Fellowes and Wolf (2004). Most political scientists think the issue was settled in the 1980s because they were trained in the 1980s and stopped reading then.

The advances in the literature owe to better measures of contributions and measurement. Silver does not add to the debate on measurement, and that is his real sin in this case.