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	<title>Comments on: Guest Post: Too-Big-To-Fail and Three Other Narratives</title>
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	<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/04/26/guest-post-too-big-to-fail-and-three-other-narratives/</link>
	<description>What happened to the global economy and what we can do about it</description>
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		<title>By: Random Links XXXXVI &#171; Random Musings of a Deranged Mind</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/04/26/guest-post-too-big-to-fail-and-three-other-narratives/#comment-15091</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Random Links XXXXVI &#171; Random Musings of a Deranged Mind]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 22 May 2009 12:27:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=3463#comment-15091</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] Statsguy on &#8220;Too Big to Fail&#8221;  [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Statsguy on &#8220;Too Big to Fail&#8221;  [...]</p>
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		<title>By: David M</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/04/26/guest-post-too-big-to-fail-and-three-other-narratives/#comment-12309</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[David M]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 Apr 2009 05:54:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=3463#comment-12309</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Says it all: &quot;I believe that banking institutions are more dangerous to our liberties than standing armies ... If the American people ever allow private banks to control the issue of their currency, first by inflation, then by deflation, the banks and corporations that will grow up around [the banks] will deprive the people of all property until their children wake-up homeless on the continent their fathers conquered. The issuing power should be taken from the banks and restored to the people, to whom it properly belongs.&quot; (Thomas Jefferson, 1743-1826)]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Says it all: &#8220;I believe that banking institutions are more dangerous to our liberties than standing armies &#8230; If the American people ever allow private banks to control the issue of their currency, first by inflation, then by deflation, the banks and corporations that will grow up around [the banks] will deprive the people of all property until their children wake-up homeless on the continent their fathers conquered. The issuing power should be taken from the banks and restored to the people, to whom it properly belongs.&#8221; (Thomas Jefferson, 1743-1826)</p>
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		<title>By: MarcusW</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/04/26/guest-post-too-big-to-fail-and-three-other-narratives/#comment-12252</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[MarcusW]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2009 16:40:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=3463#comment-12252</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[My first comment in this outstanding blog. 

I want to say &quot;thanks&quot; to Statsguy for first-rate work. What this piece does is try to seperate different diagnoses &amp; accompanying policy perscriptions, and tie them to underlying evidence. It also (although rather briefly) explains to what extent the diagnoses are consistent. 

Most of the pieces I read on this topic have their own favoured narrative and then (and I don&#039;t want this to sound unfair although it in fact will) they tend to cherry pick data in order to support their narrative. That has some value, but the kind of structured overview that Statsguy has given us is an invaluable complement to these other pieces. 

Thanks, Statsguy.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>My first comment in this outstanding blog. </p>
<p>I want to say &#8220;thanks&#8221; to Statsguy for first-rate work. What this piece does is try to seperate different diagnoses &amp; accompanying policy perscriptions, and tie them to underlying evidence. It also (although rather briefly) explains to what extent the diagnoses are consistent. </p>
<p>Most of the pieces I read on this topic have their own favoured narrative and then (and I don&#8217;t want this to sound unfair although it in fact will) they tend to cherry pick data in order to support their narrative. That has some value, but the kind of structured overview that Statsguy has given us is an invaluable complement to these other pieces. </p>
<p>Thanks, Statsguy.</p>
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		<title>By: Eric Dewey, Portland, Oregon</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/04/26/guest-post-too-big-to-fail-and-three-other-narratives/#comment-12235</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Dewey, Portland, Oregon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2009 15:12:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=3463#comment-12235</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Good point, Herbert, but I&#039;m not focusing on who screwed us. The key point in my mind is rather about who allowed us to be screwed and why they did so - and there is no question in my mind that the political officials are responsible there, both for allowing TBTF corporations to exist and for failing to exercise the regulatory authority they did have (as a mid-level banking compliance manager, I&#039;ve been intimately involved in the lack of enforcement by the banking agencies).

Their failure to exercise their authority is directly related to the regulatory capture that Simon (and others) have been pointing out.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Good point, Herbert, but I&#8217;m not focusing on who screwed us. The key point in my mind is rather about who allowed us to be screwed and why they did so &#8211; and there is no question in my mind that the political officials are responsible there, both for allowing TBTF corporations to exist and for failing to exercise the regulatory authority they did have (as a mid-level banking compliance manager, I&#8217;ve been intimately involved in the lack of enforcement by the banking agencies).</p>
<p>Their failure to exercise their authority is directly related to the regulatory capture that Simon (and others) have been pointing out.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Greg</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/04/26/guest-post-too-big-to-fail-and-three-other-narratives/#comment-12233</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2009 15:08:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=3463#comment-12233</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Corporate governance, accounting and agency issues at public firms seems like a better place to start real reform than simply breaking up TBTFs. Investment depends on rebuilding trust - this can only happen with massive changes in governance.  

Why would anyone invest in the Enronesque entities that dominate and plague the financial services sector?  We need publicly traded firms with truly independent boards and financial accountants willing to provide useful, honest, complete and necessary investment information.  Returning power to owners of publicly traded companies will probably address the destruction of the middle class and possibly TBTF narratives.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Corporate governance, accounting and agency issues at public firms seems like a better place to start real reform than simply breaking up TBTFs. Investment depends on rebuilding trust &#8211; this can only happen with massive changes in governance.  </p>
<p>Why would anyone invest in the Enronesque entities that dominate and plague the financial services sector?  We need publicly traded firms with truly independent boards and financial accountants willing to provide useful, honest, complete and necessary investment information.  Returning power to owners of publicly traded companies will probably address the destruction of the middle class and possibly TBTF narratives.</p>
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		<title>By: le grain de sable</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/04/26/guest-post-too-big-to-fail-and-three-other-narratives/#comment-12203</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[le grain de sable]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2009 11:38:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=3463#comment-12203</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Let&#039;s Make Money

Anyone with a bank account should see this film

Most of us don&#039;t know, where their money is. One thing is for certain. It &#039;s is not in the bank, to which we entrusted it. The bank and our money is already part of the cycle of the global money market.
The financial crisis is sending shock waves across the world. More than ever before, it&#039;s become clear that the markets affect us all. The film &quot;Let&#039;s Make Money&quot; by Austrian director Erwin Wagenhofer follows the tracks of money through the worldwide finance system. For example in the Costa del Sol region of Spain. Despite a million homes standing empty, the building frenzy is still going strong after 18 years, spurred by the belief that real estate is a lucrative investment.
Wagenhofer has done it again following up on the success of the &quot;We Feed the World&quot; documentary about our food industry. This one combines interviews with key people directly involved in strong-arming governments, hiding the owners of trusts and supporting laws that allow financial institutions (in London, for example) to operate unregulated in order to maximize profits for the few as they they destroy the lives of many,This is one better than Michael Moore&#039;s films because it leaves the audience feeling informed, but not manipulated. The prevailing thought after seeing this film is &quot;what can I do to make it better?&quot;.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Let&#8217;s Make Money</p>
<p>Anyone with a bank account should see this film</p>
<p>Most of us don&#8217;t know, where their money is. One thing is for certain. It &#8216;s is not in the bank, to which we entrusted it. The bank and our money is already part of the cycle of the global money market.<br />
The financial crisis is sending shock waves across the world. More than ever before, it&#8217;s become clear that the markets affect us all. The film &#8220;Let&#8217;s Make Money&#8221; by Austrian director Erwin Wagenhofer follows the tracks of money through the worldwide finance system. For example in the Costa del Sol region of Spain. Despite a million homes standing empty, the building frenzy is still going strong after 18 years, spurred by the belief that real estate is a lucrative investment.<br />
Wagenhofer has done it again following up on the success of the &#8220;We Feed the World&#8221; documentary about our food industry. This one combines interviews with key people directly involved in strong-arming governments, hiding the owners of trusts and supporting laws that allow financial institutions (in London, for example) to operate unregulated in order to maximize profits for the few as they they destroy the lives of many,This is one better than Michael Moore&#8217;s films because it leaves the audience feeling informed, but not manipulated. The prevailing thought after seeing this film is &#8220;what can I do to make it better?&#8221;.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>By: x</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/04/26/guest-post-too-big-to-fail-and-three-other-narratives/#comment-12199</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[x]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2009 10:10:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=3463#comment-12199</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&quot;The rejoinder to these worries is that the Obama Administration’s ability to make future changes will depend on the status of the economy when those changes are sought,&quot;

But the ability to make future changes is better if the economy is worse.  Them&#039;s the political facts as far as the evidence shows.  So it&#039;s crucial to fix TBTF before fixing the economy, or very soon after, before everyone goes &quot;oh, the economy&#039;s better, we don&#039;t need to fix that any more&quot;]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;The rejoinder to these worries is that the Obama Administration’s ability to make future changes will depend on the status of the economy when those changes are sought,&#8221;</p>
<p>But the ability to make future changes is better if the economy is worse.  Them&#8217;s the political facts as far as the evidence shows.  So it&#8217;s crucial to fix TBTF before fixing the economy, or very soon after, before everyone goes &#8220;oh, the economy&#8217;s better, we don&#8217;t need to fix that any more&#8221;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Selen-1</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/04/26/guest-post-too-big-to-fail-and-three-other-narratives/#comment-12174</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Selen-1]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2009 04:42:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=3463#comment-12174</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Beginning today, treat everyone you meet as if they were going to be dead by midnight. Extend them all the care, kindness and understanding you can muster. Your life will never be the same again.
 http://wupytosqose.isuisse.com/hot-women-huge-tits-porn.html - hot women huge tits porn  http://wupytosqose.isuisse.com/in-lesbian-lpga.html - in lesbian lpga]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Beginning today, treat everyone you meet as if they were going to be dead by midnight. Extend them all the care, kindness and understanding you can muster. Your life will never be the same again.<br />
 <a href="http://wupytosqose.isuisse.com/hot-women-huge-tits-porn.html" rel="nofollow">http://wupytosqose.isuisse.com/hot-women-huge-tits-porn.html</a> &#8211; hot women huge tits porn  <a href="http://wupytosqose.isuisse.com/in-lesbian-lpga.html" rel="nofollow">http://wupytosqose.isuisse.com/in-lesbian-lpga.html</a> &#8211; in lesbian lpga</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Paul</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/04/26/guest-post-too-big-to-fail-and-three-other-narratives/#comment-12164</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2009 03:29:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=3463#comment-12164</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The big banks need to be broken up now. Their enormous concentration of power has too much influence over the  decision making in Washington and will continue to powerfully affect the decisions about the resolution of the zombie banks and toxic assets as long as the big banks are around. However, Obama and Geithner has used this crisis as an excuse to pursue their own radically socialist agenda without concern  of who gets hurt.

That being said, other issues in your post stand out. 

There was not one word about Fannie and Freddie as a major cause of the collapse. Yes the big Wall Street banks aided and abetted in the collapse, but without the trillions in loans to people who long term could not afford them,  this crisis would be significantly smaller in scope. 

The Wall Street oligarchy formed a tacit alliance with the political left oligarchy and used the financial system for their own ends. Bush is also to blame because he let Wall Street and the Left get away with it. 

Another one of your  choices of causes is the decline in middle class effective incomes.  I believe that decline in buying power forced many people to get in way over their ahead, just to maintain their lifestyle. The cause was the Nanny State, not trade. 

As an example, here in Los Angeles, the business environment went from the most dynamic in the world as late as the early 70&#039;s to a city in great decline with two thirds of the city now qualifying as distressed enterprise zones . This happened because of overwrought socialist regulatory restrictions and taxes that drove out business, ruined the educational system, abetted a huge influx in illegals and drove housing prices through the roof. The ratio of average housing prices to income went from roughly 2 1/2 to one in 1970 to over 10 to one at the time of the collapse. LA went from the most educated among America&#039;s big cities to one where over 50% of the population by some polls are functionally illiterate. And according to Calculated Risk, LA County leads the nation in total job loses since 2007 at 285,000.

This is what happens to socialist economies: poverty and ruin.
 And it&#039;s what Obama and friends have in mind for the US.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The big banks need to be broken up now. Their enormous concentration of power has too much influence over the  decision making in Washington and will continue to powerfully affect the decisions about the resolution of the zombie banks and toxic assets as long as the big banks are around. However, Obama and Geithner has used this crisis as an excuse to pursue their own radically socialist agenda without concern  of who gets hurt.</p>
<p>That being said, other issues in your post stand out. </p>
<p>There was not one word about Fannie and Freddie as a major cause of the collapse. Yes the big Wall Street banks aided and abetted in the collapse, but without the trillions in loans to people who long term could not afford them,  this crisis would be significantly smaller in scope. </p>
<p>The Wall Street oligarchy formed a tacit alliance with the political left oligarchy and used the financial system for their own ends. Bush is also to blame because he let Wall Street and the Left get away with it. </p>
<p>Another one of your  choices of causes is the decline in middle class effective incomes.  I believe that decline in buying power forced many people to get in way over their ahead, just to maintain their lifestyle. The cause was the Nanny State, not trade. </p>
<p>As an example, here in Los Angeles, the business environment went from the most dynamic in the world as late as the early 70&#8242;s to a city in great decline with two thirds of the city now qualifying as distressed enterprise zones . This happened because of overwrought socialist regulatory restrictions and taxes that drove out business, ruined the educational system, abetted a huge influx in illegals and drove housing prices through the roof. The ratio of average housing prices to income went from roughly 2 1/2 to one in 1970 to over 10 to one at the time of the collapse. LA went from the most educated among America&#8217;s big cities to one where over 50% of the population by some polls are functionally illiterate. And according to Calculated Risk, LA County leads the nation in total job loses since 2007 at 285,000.</p>
<p>This is what happens to socialist economies: poverty and ruin.<br />
 And it&#8217;s what Obama and friends have in mind for the US.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: notabanker</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/04/26/guest-post-too-big-to-fail-and-three-other-narratives/#comment-12163</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[notabanker]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2009 02:15:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=3463#comment-12163</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Some continuing concerns:
Finance share of GDP growing past 12%!  Is there an upper limit beyond which &#039;profits&#039; earned from no asset creation become unsustainable?   Looks like England must be pushing this limit?  Are we next?

Unregulated leveraging! If I borrow excessively exposing myself to increasing risk and crash, I have to lose my shirt.  Bankers can borrow excessively, fail at the risk hurdle and be TBTF?  No better reason for changing banks to NTBTF (not)? Individuals hiding behind corporate identities should also be accountable and risk imprisonment.

The situation could be seen as analogous to  our highway system:

We have vehicle roadworthiness regulation (dimensions, load restrictions etc), operating regulation (keep right, obey road signs etc)

We have confidence  to use roads because all must operate so as to not injure others.  Large trucks cannot bully other drivers and operators of large vehicles are individually responsible (just like small business operators).

If unacceptable activity occurs (speeding, wrecks etc) assigned people address the problem and fix.  Each operator is not responsible for recovery action or its cost.

Now contrast this with our banking scene.  Banks and their personal income incented apparatchiks have operated with no limits. Bigger size, more profit is required each year. Will bank share of everything increase infinitely?    

Enough said about the problem scene. Now what is the description of the &#039;fixed&#039; scene?  Seems to me there is plenty of emoting about the problem or the mechanisms but no one has proposed/defined the solution scene?  Back to BAU is hardly the answer.

Please Simon tell us what is the fixed financial highway system we need and can have which will not crash.  We want to have at least the same level of confidence as when we take to the road.

May I say I have yet to see the fixed system goal description targeted by the President&#039;s fixit team.  Why is this?  Maybe they don&#039;t have a vision of success?  Are they fixated on restoring BAU for TBTF outfits?
  
Something just does not compute and our money is handed to either villains or incompetents (take your pick).

Can someone please describe the vision splendid we seek and compare this to the fixit team goal?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Some continuing concerns:<br />
Finance share of GDP growing past 12%!  Is there an upper limit beyond which &#8216;profits&#8217; earned from no asset creation become unsustainable?   Looks like England must be pushing this limit?  Are we next?</p>
<p>Unregulated leveraging! If I borrow excessively exposing myself to increasing risk and crash, I have to lose my shirt.  Bankers can borrow excessively, fail at the risk hurdle and be TBTF?  No better reason for changing banks to NTBTF (not)? Individuals hiding behind corporate identities should also be accountable and risk imprisonment.</p>
<p>The situation could be seen as analogous to  our highway system:</p>
<p>We have vehicle roadworthiness regulation (dimensions, load restrictions etc), operating regulation (keep right, obey road signs etc)</p>
<p>We have confidence  to use roads because all must operate so as to not injure others.  Large trucks cannot bully other drivers and operators of large vehicles are individually responsible (just like small business operators).</p>
<p>If unacceptable activity occurs (speeding, wrecks etc) assigned people address the problem and fix.  Each operator is not responsible for recovery action or its cost.</p>
<p>Now contrast this with our banking scene.  Banks and their personal income incented apparatchiks have operated with no limits. Bigger size, more profit is required each year. Will bank share of everything increase infinitely?    </p>
<p>Enough said about the problem scene. Now what is the description of the &#8216;fixed&#8217; scene?  Seems to me there is plenty of emoting about the problem or the mechanisms but no one has proposed/defined the solution scene?  Back to BAU is hardly the answer.</p>
<p>Please Simon tell us what is the fixed financial highway system we need and can have which will not crash.  We want to have at least the same level of confidence as when we take to the road.</p>
<p>May I say I have yet to see the fixed system goal description targeted by the President&#8217;s fixit team.  Why is this?  Maybe they don&#8217;t have a vision of success?  Are they fixated on restoring BAU for TBTF outfits?</p>
<p>Something just does not compute and our money is handed to either villains or incompetents (take your pick).</p>
<p>Can someone please describe the vision splendid we seek and compare this to the fixit team goal?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: btraven</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/04/26/guest-post-too-big-to-fail-and-three-other-narratives/#comment-12158</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[btraven]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2009 01:53:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=3463#comment-12158</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&quot;But want to say that the “too-big-to-fail” narrative has always bugged me, for the simple reason is that these large finance companies have in fact failed.&quot;

Right-on-the-money!]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;But want to say that the “too-big-to-fail” narrative has always bugged me, for the simple reason is that these large finance companies have in fact failed.&#8221;</p>
<p>Right-on-the-money!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: StatsGuy</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/04/26/guest-post-too-big-to-fail-and-three-other-narratives/#comment-12156</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[StatsGuy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2009 01:09:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=3463#comment-12156</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&quot;it responds to shocks not by absorbing the stocks but by creating further internal shocks&quot;

Very true.  If you look at the graph on US economic growth over time, the cycles grow more intense as we approach 1940 (as industrialization progresses).  This looks very much like an (undampened) oscillating system with positive feedback.

This is consistent with arguments that the economy has grown more endogenous over time.  That is, more of the value we create in the economy is manmade (therefore part of the endogenous system), rather than extracted from natural resources (and thus exogenous).

One of the positive things that seems to be emerging out of this crisis is that we have some economic institutions - like the IMF - suddenly thinking like engineers rather than like physicists.  Systems dynamics is not a scientific problem, it&#039;s an engineering problem.

Economic dampeners were removed because they caused local inefficiencies.  They were _supposed_ to cause local inefficiencies.  And frankly, some smart economists (e.g. Tobin) knew this, but got ignored.  Who&#039;s going to listen to the guy who says &quot;we&#039;re intentionally creating inefficiencies to make the system more robust, because otherwise it&#039;s going to blow up in 10 years&quot;?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;it responds to shocks not by absorbing the stocks but by creating further internal shocks&#8221;</p>
<p>Very true.  If you look at the graph on US economic growth over time, the cycles grow more intense as we approach 1940 (as industrialization progresses).  This looks very much like an (undampened) oscillating system with positive feedback.</p>
<p>This is consistent with arguments that the economy has grown more endogenous over time.  That is, more of the value we create in the economy is manmade (therefore part of the endogenous system), rather than extracted from natural resources (and thus exogenous).</p>
<p>One of the positive things that seems to be emerging out of this crisis is that we have some economic institutions &#8211; like the IMF &#8211; suddenly thinking like engineers rather than like physicists.  Systems dynamics is not a scientific problem, it&#8217;s an engineering problem.</p>
<p>Economic dampeners were removed because they caused local inefficiencies.  They were _supposed_ to cause local inefficiencies.  And frankly, some smart economists (e.g. Tobin) knew this, but got ignored.  Who&#8217;s going to listen to the guy who says &#8220;we&#8217;re intentionally creating inefficiencies to make the system more robust, because otherwise it&#8217;s going to blow up in 10 years&#8221;?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: silly things</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/04/26/guest-post-too-big-to-fail-and-three-other-narratives/#comment-12148</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[silly things]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2009 00:08:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=3463#comment-12148</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XrDxlf9bMYU&amp;feature=related]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span style="text-align:center; display: block;"><a href="http://baselinescenario.com/2009/04/26/guest-post-too-big-to-fail-and-three-other-narratives/"><img src="http://img.youtube.com/vi/XrDxlf9bMYU/2.jpg" alt="" /></a></span></p>
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		<title>By: silly things</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/04/26/guest-post-too-big-to-fail-and-three-other-narratives/#comment-12146</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[silly things]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Apr 2009 23:52:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=3463#comment-12146</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Solving the systemic risk problem will automatically solve Too-Big-To-Fail.  However, fixing TBTF by limiting bank size will not automatically solve the systemic risk problem.  If after analyzing systemic risk holistically and we realize we have to limit bank size, I’d be fine with that.  However, the economic recovery has to take first priority.  Simplistic fixation on TBTF above all else is intellectually sloppy at best, obstructing the recovery efforts of others at worst.  


James Kwak, I’ve replied to your other comment on relative importance of comments.  Hope you enjoy my reply as much as I enjoy writing it.  Hahah!


Statsguy, thank you for the excellent write up.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Solving the systemic risk problem will automatically solve Too-Big-To-Fail.  However, fixing TBTF by limiting bank size will not automatically solve the systemic risk problem.  If after analyzing systemic risk holistically and we realize we have to limit bank size, I’d be fine with that.  However, the economic recovery has to take first priority.  Simplistic fixation on TBTF above all else is intellectually sloppy at best, obstructing the recovery efforts of others at worst.  </p>
<p>James Kwak, I’ve replied to your other comment on relative importance of comments.  Hope you enjoy my reply as much as I enjoy writing it.  Hahah!</p>
<p>Statsguy, thank you for the excellent write up.</p>
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		<title>By: Min</title>
		<link>http://baselinescenario.com/2009/04/26/guest-post-too-big-to-fail-and-three-other-narratives/#comment-12143</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Min]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Apr 2009 23:43:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://baselinescenario.com/?p=3463#comment-12143</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[First impression: This is not a false dichotomy, it is a false &quot;tesserotomy&quot; -- if that really is a word. There are not four competing narratives, they are all intertwined.

Some brief comments:

StatsGuy: &quot;TBTF may have been the trigger,&quot;

&quot;Too big to fail&quot; is not only a description, it is a policy, one that has been explicit in regard to banks since 1984, when the government called Continetal Illinois &quot;too big to fail&quot;. It is a policy of both Republican and Democratic administrations. The politicians have not talked much about this policy, because it is their policy, and they like to pretend that we do not have welfare capitalism. Given the obvious moral hazard, why economists have not been jumping up and down and holding their breath until they turned blue is another question. This policy is inherent in the other mentioned aspects of our current crisis.

Systemic Risk: Having banks that are too big to fail is one kind of systemic risk. Aside from that, the massive growth of the financial system occurred since 1980, and the policy of too big to fail has been part and parcel of that growth. Being too big to fail endowed those financial institutions with political clout, which played no small part in changing the system to enable them to become even bigger, richer and more powerful.

Destruction of the Middle Class: (That is an overstatement, of course, but we know what you mean. :)) Welfare capitalism tends to increase the stratification of society. (Much more can be said, of course. But these are brief comments. :)) Boom and bust cycles are hardly healthy homeostasis. However, crashes can be great levelers. That will not be the case if the rich and powerful are protected and put back on their pedestals.

Irrational Exuberance: The capacity for irrational exuberance does seem to be innate in humans. (However, there is evidence that people can be trained to manage risk rationally.) Irrational exuberance can lead to crashes, but crashes do not necessarily bring the system down. For that to happen you have to have systemic vulnerabilities, such as having institutions that are too big to fail. For those institutions, the exuberance may not be irrational. After all, they are protected on the downside. Bubble we win, bust they lose. Institutions that are too big to fail feed off of the irrational exuberance of others. They may even whip it up, or at least do nothing to rein it in.

What to do now?

I agree that it would be counterproductive to do a hatchet job on too big to fail institutions, at least for now. But the government seems intent upon making them whole. The theory seems to be that if they are made whole, then they will start lending again. Perhaps we should leave them weakened and instead throw our support to other, smaller banks that had little to do with bringing about the current crisis, and let them do the lending. :)]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>First impression: This is not a false dichotomy, it is a false &#8220;tesserotomy&#8221; &#8212; if that really is a word. There are not four competing narratives, they are all intertwined.</p>
<p>Some brief comments:</p>
<p>StatsGuy: &#8220;TBTF may have been the trigger,&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;Too big to fail&#8221; is not only a description, it is a policy, one that has been explicit in regard to banks since 1984, when the government called Continetal Illinois &#8220;too big to fail&#8221;. It is a policy of both Republican and Democratic administrations. The politicians have not talked much about this policy, because it is their policy, and they like to pretend that we do not have welfare capitalism. Given the obvious moral hazard, why economists have not been jumping up and down and holding their breath until they turned blue is another question. This policy is inherent in the other mentioned aspects of our current crisis.</p>
<p>Systemic Risk: Having banks that are too big to fail is one kind of systemic risk. Aside from that, the massive growth of the financial system occurred since 1980, and the policy of too big to fail has been part and parcel of that growth. Being too big to fail endowed those financial institutions with political clout, which played no small part in changing the system to enable them to become even bigger, richer and more powerful.</p>
<p>Destruction of the Middle Class: (That is an overstatement, of course, but we know what you mean. :)) Welfare capitalism tends to increase the stratification of society. (Much more can be said, of course. But these are brief comments. :)) Boom and bust cycles are hardly healthy homeostasis. However, crashes can be great levelers. That will not be the case if the rich and powerful are protected and put back on their pedestals.</p>
<p>Irrational Exuberance: The capacity for irrational exuberance does seem to be innate in humans. (However, there is evidence that people can be trained to manage risk rationally.) Irrational exuberance can lead to crashes, but crashes do not necessarily bring the system down. For that to happen you have to have systemic vulnerabilities, such as having institutions that are too big to fail. For those institutions, the exuberance may not be irrational. After all, they are protected on the downside. Bubble we win, bust they lose. Institutions that are too big to fail feed off of the irrational exuberance of others. They may even whip it up, or at least do nothing to rein it in.</p>
<p>What to do now?</p>
<p>I agree that it would be counterproductive to do a hatchet job on too big to fail institutions, at least for now. But the government seems intent upon making them whole. The theory seems to be that if they are made whole, then they will start lending again. Perhaps we should leave them weakened and instead throw our support to other, smaller banks that had little to do with bringing about the current crisis, and let them do the lending. :)</p>
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